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


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NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA DISPUTES:
PROSPECTS FOR COMMON WESTERN STRATEGIES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis traces the origins of NATO's out-of-area debate and suggests that the Middle East was a major strategic concern from the outset. However, NATO has been unable to formulate a common security policy to protect Western interests in the Middle East. The thesis suggests that out-of-area contingencies in the Middle East might be dealt with more effectively through United States-Western European Union (WEU) cooperation than under NATO auspices. This assessment is made in view of the successful ad hoc coordination of Western naval operations in the 1987-1988 "Tanker War" and in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Cooperation between the United States and the WEU, both pillars of NATO, seems to be more practical politically than through NATO itself. The thesis concludes that the allies concerned must develop improved institutional links between the WEU and NATO in order to respond to future contingencies beyond Europe. In this way the United States and the WEU can utilize all of their capabilities and assets effectively.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The "out-of-area" problem of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been controversial since the founding of the alliance. Despite this long historical debate, no resolution to the problem has evolved, as was evident after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet the Middle East area is one in which a unified Western politico-military position might be most urgently and immediately required in the interests of effective action. Major Western countries have historically demonstrated a great deal of interest in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from NATO's beginning to the present.

This thesis examines the West's strategic interests in the Middle East by investigating three major aspects of the subject: 1) the out-of-area debate in the formative years of NATO and arguments of the Parties over the territorial scope of the Treaty; 2) the effects of selected major Middle East conflicts on NATO members, namely the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and Western naval operations in 1987-1988 (the "Tanker War") during the Iran-Iraq war and in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf war; and 3) potential military cooperation between the United States and the WEU as a possible partial answer to NATO's geostrategic concerns in the Middle East.

The thesis concludes that, in view of the history of this problem, it is unlikely that NATO will be able to agree on the

conduct of out-of-Europe security operations in the future. Indeed, the historical record suggests that NATO's coordination of out-of-area operations might well cause a recurrence of past transatlantic differences. Responding to out-of-area challenges with a partnership between the United States and the WEU seems to be a more politically practical measure than trying to adapt NATO to this purpose. This approach to addressing Western security concerns in the Middle East was quite successful in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991.

Because of the sharp political differences within the Atlantic Alliance about the use of NATO in contingencies beyond Europe, it would seem prudent to develop further a vehicle that was used successfully on two separate occasions, that is, the United States-WEU ad hoc cooperation in the Middle East during the 1987-1988 "Tanker War" and the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. Cooperation between the United States and the WEU, both pillars of NATO, seems to be more practical politically than through NATO itself. The allies concerned must develop improved institutional links between the WEU and NATO in order to respond to future contingencies beyond Europe. In this way the United States and the WEU can utilize all of their capabilities and assets effectively.

I. INTRODUCTION

The "out-of-area problem of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been controversial since the founding of the alliance. Despite this long historical debate, no resolution to the problem has evolved, as was evident after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet the Middle East area is one in which a unified Western politico-military position might be most urgently and immediately required in the interests of effective action. Major Western countries have historically demonstrated a great deal of interest in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from NATO's beginning to the present.

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¹The terms Middle East and Persian Gulf will be used interchangeably in this work. The former emerged in an attempt to define a single strategic theater for the region. The term Middle East will be defined as Israel and the predominantly Moslem States in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Southwest Asia.

1990-1991 Persian Gulf war; and 3) potential military cooperation between the United States and the WEU as a possible partial answer to NATO's geostrategic concerns in the Middle East.

One of the initial hypotheses to be tested is that the out-of-area debate began with the formation of NATO and that the Middle East was a major strategic concern from the outset. Another hypothesis to be investigated is that the majority of NATO governments have security interests in the Middle East. The thesis examines the growing role of the Western European Union (WEU) in the European Community, in view of the December 1991 Maastricht Treaty on European Union.

One of the questions to be answered in this thesis is whether the WEU might be a partial answer in promoting co-operation between the projected European political union and NATO. Based on this premise, joint United States-WEU politico-military ventures outside the NATO area could be possible. On the other hand, several members of the Atlantic Alliance might decide not to participate in such operations because of the North Atlantic Treaty limitations regarding the geographical zone of application. Other factors might also be important in dissuading some allies from intervention, such as domestic politics or oil dependency. For these reasons, NATO is probably not the most politically promising vehicle for these types of campaigns.

This thesis argues that another option must be sought to protect the West's interests in the Middle East, and it proposes the possibility of encouraging the United States and the WEU to work together to resolve such issues in the future. Another possibility might be more systematic preparation for *ad hoc* action by the allies most likely to be politically and militarily disposed to intervene in the Middle East -the United States, France, Britain and possibly Italy.

In short, one of the hypotheses to be examined is that the majority of NATO governments have security concerns in at least one portion of the world outside Europe, and that common denominator is the Middle East. In view of this premise, joint politico-military ventures should be possible. Yet several members of the Atlantic Alliance would refrain from joint military actions in the Middle East because of various factors, such as Treaty limitations, domestic political influences, and oil dependency. These factors and others are discussed in this thesis to determine if the national security concerns of the nations under discussion are such that a non-NATO framework is more politically practical than NATO. For this reason, one could argue, NATO is not the vehicle for these types of campaigns, and another option must be sought to protect the West's interests in this area. Perhaps the answer in settling NATO's out-of-area dilemma is the possibility of the United States and the WEU working together to meet such challenges in the future.

II. THE ORIGINS OF NATO'S OUT-OF-AREA PROBLEM

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the origins of NATO's "out-of-area" problem from the formation of the Brussels pact to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This analysis will reveal that the out-of-area problem has existed since the conception of the Atlantic Alliance. In the formative years of NATO the original architects envisaged a world-wide regional defensive pact that would essentially establish a strategic "hold line" against Soviet aggression. This original idea of "containment" was a grand conception; but it was considered a difficult system to achieve. Consequently, it was decided that a regional defensive pact between North America and Western Europe should be concluded instead.

The out-of-area problem actually started over the issue of whether the other free countries of Europe should be included as members of the North Atlantic Pact. This dispute later led some of the participating governments to argue for inclusion of certain colonial possessions too. Thus, the out-of-area dispute was one of the major problematic issues for the participants negotiating the Treaty.⁴

⁴For a superb introduction to the out-of-area problem see Marc Bentinck, "NATO's Out-Of-Area Problem," Adelphi Papers, No. 211, (Autumn 1986), pp. 3-66.

A. BRUSSELS PACT TO ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The origins of the Atlantic Alliance stem from the failure of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1947.³ This led to informal discussions between Britain's Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin and U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall about the idea of developing a defensive pact in Europe.⁴ Subsequently, Bevin began to develop his concept of a "Western Union," wherein he pictured a defensive pact between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries based on the Treaty of Dunkirk.⁵ This in effect served a dual purpose by guaranteeing France's security and establishing a formula for a transatlantic defensive pact against the Soviet Union. He also conceptualized Germany as a member of this pact, because of his awareness that the real threat was the Soviet Union.⁶

³ See Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 49. See Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 506. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) p. 65. For more detail about the inability to achieve a four power resolution on the German question see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, (Westport: CT., Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 49.

⁴ Alan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance," in American Defense Policy, Fifth Edition, ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 298.

⁵ Ibid., p. 299.

⁶ Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, p. 63.

On January 13, 1948, Marshall received Bevin's summary of his concept of a Western Union. In short, Bevin believed that all the free countries of Europe had to form a Western European defensive pact to maintain peace and that it needed to be "backed by the Americas and the Dominions." Bevin stated that this system would be comprised of Italy, Portugal, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France, and Greece, and if circumstances permitted, would include Germany and Spain.⁷

John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs, reviewed Bevin's proposal. In his view, it was unwise for the United States to associate itself with a defensive pact that was modelled after the Treaty of Dunkirk. George Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, believed that a defensive pact modelled after the Treaty of Dunkirk was not "the best way to lead into it."⁸ State Department officials argued that a defensive pact modelled after the Rio Pact would be more likely to pass in Congress because a precedent had been established.⁹ Prime Minister Paul-Henri

⁷See summary of Bevin's concepts on the formation of a Western Union in, Foreign Relations of the United States (henceforth FRUS) 1948, vol. 3. p. 5. See also Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 298.

⁸Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 299. Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, January 20, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 7.

⁹Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 300. See also Achilles, "US Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance," Part 1, NATO Review, August 1979, pp. 11-12.

Spaak of Belgium was also opposed to a Dunkirk Treaty formula; he believed that Russia was the greater threat to Western Europe's security.¹⁰ Furthermore, the Benelux Governments felt that a defensive pact based on the Dunkirk Treaty was "narrowly conceived," and that a Rio Treaty formula provided better guarantees.¹¹

The impetus for concluding the Brussels Treaty was the collapse of the Republic of Czechoslovakia in March 1948, coupled with communist threats in Finland, Norway, Italy, Germany and other European areas. Europe's uneasiness spurred Bevin to urgently submit his proposal to conclude an Atlantic Security Pact for the Secretary of State's review. Marshal evaluated Bevin's plan and without consultation from his staff favorably replied, "we are prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic Security System."¹² The "Soviet tide" seemed more real than ever, and this resulted in the Europeans expediting the Brussels pact

¹⁰Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, January 19, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 6. and Theodore C. Achilles, US Role in Negotiations that led to Atlantic Alliance, Part 1, p. 11.

¹¹Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European 1936-1966, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) p. 147.

¹²Letter from Secretary of State Marshal to British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel, 12 March, in FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 48. For a description of the tension in Europe see, Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of Nato, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 12, and Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, pp. 304-305.

negotiations. France was now convinced to support a multilateral defense pact against any aggressor, and thus the Brussels Pact was modelled after the Rio de Janeiro Treaty.¹³

On March 17, 1948 the Brussels Treaty was signed and favorably received by President Truman. On this same day, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress; he stated that the Brussels Treaty was a positive step toward world peace. Truman assured the Western Europeans that the United States would provide "the support which the situation requires." He added, "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so."¹⁴

During this period the emphasis of the transatlantic talks focused on developing some type of defensive pact within Western Europe. Yet, it was limited to mainly five European powers, Britain, France and the Benelux states. Bevin's idea of having a Western Union that included all the free countries of Europe collapsed. Because of this development the first out-of-area dispute was over the extension of this defensive pact in Europe. In fact, the Brussels powers were bitterly opposed to extending the defensive pact to include other

¹³Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, pp. 302-303. See also, Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, p. 69.

¹⁴Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, Documents on American Foreign Relations Vol. X, (Bristol, CT: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 7. See also Achilles, US Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance, Part 1, p. 12.

European countries that were not covered under the Brussels Treaty. The reasons for this fact will be examined later.

B. FIRST STAGE: THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ON SECURITY

Five days after the signing of the Brussels Pact, the first intergovernmental meeting was held between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada on March 22, 1948. French participation was excluded from the first round of talks because the French were considered, "as a security risk," according to Hickerson.¹⁵ The reason given was the communist party's strength in the French government, and the consequent fear that the secret talks could be compromised.¹⁶

Additionally, this permitted the United States to confer with the British specifically on their expected role in the alliance and Germany's possible inclusion in the Atlantic Pact.¹⁷

The participants in the first round of intergovernmental talks believed that it was conceptually feasible to devise "a

¹⁵Minutes of the first meeting of the United States -United Kingdom -Canada security conversations, March 22, FRUS, 1948 Vol. 3. p. 59.

¹⁶Stuart, Douglas and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-Of-Area Problems Since 1949, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 183. For a complete discussion of the communist strength in French politics between 1945-50 see, Roger Morgan, West European Politics since 1945: The Shaping of the European Community, (London: B. T. Batsford LTD, 1973), pp. 46-48.

¹⁷Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance, p. 183.

world-wide pact of self-defense," adhering to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.¹⁸ It was envisaged that this could be accomplished by establishing regional pacts world-wide and thus essentially having a defensive "hold line" against aggression. Hickerson noted that the hold line theory would place the alliance in a paradoxical situation because it would "convince an aggressor that everything outside the line [was] vulnerable to easy aggression." This significant statement marks the beginning of the "out-of-area" debate. Thus by delimiting the alliance boundaries all areas outside the territorial scope of a treaty became open to Soviet influence. The world-wide view was plausible, but forming a transatlantic alliance was more pragmatic and less cumbersome than constructing a global alliance structure.¹⁹ After those Talks the tripartite group recommended the following points:

- For the President to extend invitations to the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, the Benelux States, Portugal and The Netherlands to take part in a conference on a collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic Area.
- That a Presidential Declaration be announced stating that an armed attack on any of the Brussels Treaty states or free countries of Europe [would be regarded] as an armed attack against the United States and would be dealt with

¹⁸Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 303.

¹⁹Minutes of the first meeting of the United States-United Kingdom- Canada Security Conversations, held at Washington, March 22, 1948. The minutes of this series of top secret meetings, were held at the Pentagon between March 22 and April 1, FRUS 1948 Vol 3. p. 61.

by America in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

- To guarantee the territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran. Followed by a possible Middle East security agreement including North Atlantic pact members.
- And when possible for the Western Zones of Germany, Austria, and Spain to be considered in joining the pact as members.¹

The tripartite participants fundamentally agreed that a treaty-based formula should be the nucleus for a transatlantic alliance.² Bevin later echoed this same position, that a treaty-based formula was the only possible solution, as stated in a telegram to Acting Secretary of State Lovett:

...we do not believe that there is any substitute for a Treaty if something effective is to be done. A real defence system worked out by the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Western European States would affect the whole approach of the world to the peace problem and be the first great step towards what could ultimately become a real world collective Security System, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.³

However, to pursue this route Senate advice on this issue was required. Senator Vandenberg was persuaded by Lovett and his State Department staff to sponsor a resolution for a

¹"Minutes of the Sixth meeting of the United States--United Kingdom--Canada Security Conversations, held at Washington, April 1, 1948 FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 71-75.

²Ibid., p. 72.

³Paraphrase of a telegram from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) of April 9th regarding recent talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 80. Point of origin, date and addressee not indicated on file copy. Apparently delivered to Lovett through British Ambassador Inverchapel.

"Collective Defense Agreement for the North Atlantic Area."

On June 11, 1948, the resolution was approved by the Senate. This in essence gave the President the needed advice and consent required to proceed with the negotiations for a North Atlantic Pact.²³

What appeared to be a smooth process during the first talks merely set the stage for intense debate over the territorial scope of the transatlantic alliance during the following negotiations. We will examine this debate over the inclusion of non-Brussels pact states into the transatlantic alliance. The issue to expand the alliance to include other European nations triggered the out-of-area debate over Europe.

C. SECOND STAGE: THE WASHINGTON EXPLORATORY TALKS

The resumption of the "Washington Exploratory Talks" in July 1948 moved at a purposely sluggish pace. As Achilles explains, "The process was deliberately a leisurely one since the US team made clear the importance it attached to avoiding public controversy until after the Presidential election in early November."²⁴ The first session of the Ambassadors Committee was convened by Acting Secretary of State Robert

²³For insights into the US commitment alternatives see, Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance, pp. 82-114. Also the position of the United States with respect to support for Western Union and other related free countries in FRUS, 1948 Vol. 3. pp. 85-88. And Achilles, US Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance, Part 1, p. 13.

²⁴Achilles, p. 13.

Lovett, with Ambassadors from Canada and the Brussels Treaty powers. These talks were the principal means for participants to discuss the alliance formation. The actual negotiation of the treaty was conducted by the "International Working Group," comprised of principal assistants from each government.²⁵

One of the major issues that had to be resolved immediately was the question of membership and defining what countries should be covered in any North Atlantic security arrangement. Director of the Working Group Charles Bohlen said that the membership question "might be one of the most difficult aspects of the problem," because all the free countries of Western Europe must be considered and, "if any strategically important country were omitted from the group [North Atlantic pact] criticism might be aroused in the Congress."²⁶ The United States wanted to ensure that the widest possible European security pact evolved and that it included all the free countries of Western Europe.

²⁵See minutes of the first meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 148. Also first meeting of the Working Group participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 12, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 182. For a detailed explanation of both committees' functions see Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 35-36.

²⁶Memorandum of the third meeting of the Working Group participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 15, in FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 187.

Ostensibly, the participants in the Working Group were faced with a complex situation, as Elizabeth Sherwood explains:

...in the very act of defining the precise territory of the proposed alliance, they created potential new security problems for themselves. For by defining what was "in-area," they also established an out-of-area. In so doing, they might lead other nations to conclude that out-of-area concerns were not of vital import to the security of the Atlantic powers.²⁷

To resolve this troubling geostrategic question the United States Working Group had to settle its own internal disputes on these issues first. The United States Working Group participants were split into two major schools of thought regarding the membership issue. They included both the "Atlantic" and "Europe First,"²⁸ schools of thought; and they differed on the inclusion of certain countries as members in the North Atlantic pact. The countries in question at this point were the "stepping-stone-states," of Norway, Portugal (including Azores), Denmark (including Greenland), and

²⁷Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 9-10.

²⁸The Atlantic term is a derivative of Stuart and Tow's, "Global Strongpoints" school of thought category that they place Kennan and Bohlen in. For the purposes of this paper an Atlantic category was developed inasmuch as it clarifies their position explicitly. See Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance, pp. 42-44.

Iceland.²⁹ In addition, the other countries under discussion were Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Ireland, and the Scandinavian states.

The Atlantic supporters (Kennan, Bohlen) wanted to strictly limit the membership to countries whose shores were "washed by the waters of the North Atlantic."³⁰ In a word, membership would be founded on geographic principles alone. Kennan also supported the stepping-stone concept, since these Atlantic islands would bridge North America to Europe. The reason for his geographic limitations was to prevent the United States from stretching its military resources too thin. As Kennan explains:

My view as to how this should be done...provides for two anchors: the U.S.-Canada anchor and the Brussels Pact anchor which would constitute the actual members of the pact. The stepping-stone countries would enter into an association with the full members of the pact whereby the latter would guarantee them against attack, and they in their turn would agree to make available to the members of

²⁹Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 306. See also, Achilles, "US Role in Negotiations that Led to Atlantic Alliance," NATO Review, October 1979, Part 2, p. 16. And memorandum of the ninth meeting of the Working Group participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, August, 9, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 210-211.

³⁰A phrase used by Kennan on numerous occasions in State Department correspondence. See memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff November 24, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 286.

³¹George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), p. 411.

the pact military facilities on their territories.

The Atlantic school of thought would undoubtedly leave out some significant countries in Europe, whereas the Europe First supporters (Hickerson, Achilles, Marshall) wanted to assure the widest European membership in the alliance. Therefore, Hickerson supported the membership of the same countries as Kennan, but proposed expanding the pact to include Italy and possibly Greece and Turkey. In fact, he emphatically advocated an open door policy for alliance membership to all Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) states.³³

Unquestionably, Hickerson's view on membership differed significantly from Kennan's on two points. First, Hickerson called for Italy to be included as a member of the Brussels Treaty, and this would in effect make Italy a member of the alliance. Second, he held that the same association of the stepping-stone states should be applied to the other members of the OEEC.³⁴ Italy's association with the alliance was not an easy task to accomplish because it received opposition from all European countries. The idea to expand the Brussels pact was a problem because the Brussels powers were strictly

³⁴Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), August 31, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 225.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

thinking of themselves. As Lawrence Kaplan explains, "The nub of this problem seemed to be the resistance of the Western Union initiators to share American largesse with outlying nations."¹⁷

The European Working Group participants also had differing positions on the membership question and the limits of the North Atlantic Area. For example, the French argued that they were against the idea of expanding the North Atlantic pact or the Brussels pact to include countries such as Italy, Greece or Turkey. However, the French and the Belgians did insist that their African territories be included in the territorial scope of the pact. The British and Canadians also favored excluding Italy from an Atlantic pact. They suggested that to include Italy while excluding Greece and Turkey would damage both the latter countries tremendously or even worse drive them into the Soviet sphere.¹⁸

¹⁷ Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 25. See also Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years, p. 108.

¹⁸ Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) August 31, in FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 225. See also memorandum of the thirteenth meeting of the Working Group participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, September 2, in FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. pp. 226-228. For Canada's opposition to Italy and Greece see, minutes of the fifth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 9, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 179. For an explanation of France and Belgium's request on African colonies see Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 55-58.

Undoubtedly, the power players during these negotiations were the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. This inner-circle started back at the first round of intergovernmental talks where it was decided to exclude France.³⁷ All major decisions were made by these countries and sometimes just the United States decision in itself was enough. A price had to be paid by the Europeans for the United States acquiescence on certain matters. Ostensibly, this unique consultation style became the "pattern in subsequent consultations on the definition of alliance interests beyond Europe."³⁸

After this intense debate on the working level a final draft paper was submitted on September 9, 1948, to the Ambassadors' Committee for final review. This document provided the provisional outlines for a North Atlantic Pact. It gave the basis for the territorial scope of a North Atlantic security arrangement, defined its relationship to the security of other nations and suggested articles for a treaty.

After reviewing the final draft, the Ambassadors' Committee

³⁷ Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 11.

³⁸ Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 16. For a description of each member's influence and participation in the Working Group see Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 56-60.

sent this document to their respective governments for further evaluation.

D. INTERIM PERIOD: REVISION OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ITALY

In November 1948 a new perspective on Italy was devised by Kennan that completely changed the United States policy on Italy's inclusion as a member in the North Atlantic pact. Kennan submitted a memorandum to the Secretary of State in late November regarding his concerns about the forthcoming negotiations for a North Atlantic security pact. He emphatically expressed his opinion that the pact should be restricted to the North Atlantic area because "attempts to go further afield and to include countries beyond that area might have undesirable consequences."⁴⁰ He further argued that a logical limit to the alliance geographic boundaries must be maintained, or it would result in the United States overextending itself politically and militarily.⁴¹ Therefore, he unequivocally recommended the exclusion of any

³⁹Memorandum by the participants in the Washington Security Talks, July 6 to September 9, submitted to their respective governments for study and comment, September 9, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 237-248.

⁴⁰Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), November 24, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 286. For detail reasoning behind this memorandum see Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 409-413.

⁴¹Ibid.

nation outside the scope of the North Atlantic territorial region, namely Italy.

This analysis actually changed the United States position by opposing full membership for Italy and supporting merely an "association" of Italy with the North Atlantic pact.⁴² This amounted to a great coup for the Atlantic school of thought. During the forthcoming negotiations in December, it seemed that all odds were against Italy having any support for membership in the new alliance in Europe. However, to the surprise of the United States, France suddenly changed its position and became Italy's sole advocate for membership in the North Atlantic pact.

E. THIRD STAGE: DRAFTING OF THE TREATY

When the Washington Exploratory Talks reconvened on 10 December, Lovett expressed an intention to "move as rapidly as possible" in concluding a treaty. Lovett added that the most pressing issue for the Ambassadors' Committee was to determine the North Atlantic pact membership and its territorial scope.⁴³ Lovett tried to preempt fellow participants from including their colonial possessions. For instance, he specifically transmitted a telegram to Prime Minister Spaak of

⁴²Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 203.

⁴³Minutes of the eighth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, December 10, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 310-311.

Belgium, indicating that the United States opposed any inclusion of African territory in the defined area. In the following week on December 22, France presented its changed position on Italy and now supported its membership in the alliance; additionally, France argued for its North African provinces to be included in the territorial scope of the North Atlantic pact. Thus, France essentially used Italy to facilitate its argument to have another Mediterranean area covered under the auspices of the Treaty, namely North Africa.⁴⁴ As Ambassador Henri Bonnet explained:

...it would be extremely difficult for France to leave a part of its metropolitan territory out of the area. Algeria was a part of France and in the same relation to France as Alaska or Florida to the United States.⁴⁵

Surprisingly, the Belgians and the Dutch opposed the French position.⁴⁶ The United States remained adamant in its objection to including any African territory in addition to opposing Italy's membership in the alliance. The British were sympathetic regarding France's Algerian question; in fact, their government "had been thinking of the inclusion of

⁴⁴Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Embassy in Belgium, December 11, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 314. See Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 214.

⁴⁵Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years, p. 110.

⁴⁶Minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 325. see also Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 203.

⁴⁷Henderson, The Birth of NATO, p. 69.

all Africa north of latitude 30 [degrees] north," Sir Oliver Franks said. Nonetheless, the British were still against Italy's membership in the alliance.⁴⁸ The Canadians did not support the inclusion of Italy; however, they suggested that if Italy became a member, then France's proposition was logical. In fact, "there would be a good case on geographical grounds for including the Mediterranean coast of North Africa," Ambassador Hume Wrong said. The Canadians argued nonetheless that the fundamental premise of the North Atlantic pact was for its membership to remain a North Atlantic one.⁴⁹

The Canadians, perhaps unwittingly, made a case for France, in asserting that if Italy were included in the pact then it would make sense to seriously consider other countries with a Mediterranean coast. Lovett posed his final analysis on this issue by indicating if France felt so strongly about North Africa, France would have included it in the Brussels Treaty. Bonnet objected to this assertion; he countered that the Brussels Treaty was a pledge limited to an attack on any member in Europe; however, if conflict occurred outside the treaty area, the members would consult on the matter. Finally, Lovett suggested that a possible solution to this question was for the pact to extend a declaration assuring the

⁴⁸Minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 326.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 327. See also Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 203.

territorial integrity of Italy, North Africa, Greece and Turkey. Those issues were taken up by the Working Group, which formulated a draft of the treaty and submitted it to the Ambassadors' Committee on December 24.

The Working Group could reach agreement on all articles except for Article 5, which defined the area of the proposed pact. Article 5 had two alternative solutions to the territorial question: alternative (a) adhered strictly to the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; alternative (b) included the North Atlantic, North Africa, the Western Mediterranean, and Italy. After reviewing this draft the Ambassadors' Committee agreed to forward this report to their respective governments for further evaluation.

The participating governments tried earnestly to resolve their out-of-area problem. To appease everyone, however, short-cuts were taken to facilitate the negotiating process. In reality, nothing was resolved on how to deal with a possible out-of-area problem, except for the idea of consultations if any member's "territorial integrity" was

¹See Minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 325. And also Reid, Times of Fear and Hope, p. 213.

²Report of the International Working Group to the Ambassadors' Committee, December 24, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. pp. 333-335. See also Henderson, The Birth of NATO, p. 71.

threatened. Nonetheless, in the final phase of negotiations each government could agree upon the interpretation of the Treaty.

F. FOURTH AND FINAL STAGE: THE TREATY AND AGREED INTERPRETATIONS

The Ambassadors' Committee reconvened for its final phase of the alliance process on January 14, 1949. Their goal was to conclude the final text of the Treaty. Lovett warned that the two problematic issues of Algeria and Italy had to be resolved quickly. Less urgent was the issue of extending invitations of membership to the Scandinavian countries and Portugal so they could conclude this process.⁵²

In this final phase, France changed its tactics in regard to North Africa. France still insisted on the inclusion of Italy; however, instead of including all of French North Africa, it limited its demand to incorporating only the French Departments of Algeria. This tactful development resulted in

⁵²This is referring to Article 4 of the Treaty, see NATO Basic Documents, NATO Information Service, (Brussels: 1976) p. 12.

⁵³Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, January 14, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 27.

only the United States and Canada remaining in opposition to the French proposal.⁵⁴

Most of the participants objected to Italy's inclusion as a member, but were sympathetic toward France's position on Algeria. France had a superior moral case, they argued, because "Algeria was a part of France as Alaska to the United States."⁵⁵ In a word, Algeria was constitutionally integrated into France since 1848 and claimed as a natural prolongation of France.⁵⁶ Ironically, Canada and the United States superficially protested this matter for no apparent reason; Escott Reid, a Canadian delegate to the talks, explained:

...we would be prepared, although reluctantly, to accept the inclusion of the three departments of Algeria...By January 24 the State Department had also moved to this position. Achilles told Stone on that day 'for his own

⁵⁴Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance, p. 185. See Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 216-217. And Henderson, The Birth of NATO, p. 81.

⁵⁵An analogy Ambassador Bonnet used to make his case during the tenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory talks. See minutes of the tenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks, December 22, FRUS 1948, Vol. 3. p. 325.

⁵⁶ Like any other French department, Algeria sent representatives to the French parliament. France had a policy of complete assimilation of Algeria into France. This assimilation policy was perceived in a negative light by some Algerians, because it discouraged use of the Arabic language, and seemed to contradict the principle of national self-determination. See Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1956), p. 714. See also The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State telegram, January 7, FRUS 1949 Vol. 4. p. 14. And Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 215.

very private ear that the United States will swallow Algeria.' In turn Stone told Achilles - for his own very private ear - that Canada would also swallow Algeria... Achilles said that for various reasons they [the Americans] wanted to let this question hang in the balance for another five weeks.⁵⁷

In essence, by late January the inclusion of Algeria in the territorial scope of the Treaty was a moot issue. The delay in telling the French merely prolonged their agony. Dean Acheson, the new Secretary of State, said in early March that it was now suitable for the Senate to extend the Treaty area to include Algeria. The United States was also now open to discussion on the Italian question.⁵⁸ In view of this, France pressed on with the inclusion of Italy with greater fervor.

At this point France was the only advocate for Italy's membership. Italy made several attempts to sway the United States position on its behalf for inclusion in the alliance. In a telegram to Secretary of State Acheson, Italian Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani candidly requested Italy's inclusion; "The Italian Government desires to adhere to [the] treaty at present under discussion between the

⁵⁷Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 217.

⁵⁸Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton and Company, 1969), p. 278. See Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance, pp. 186-187. And Minutes of the fourteenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 1, FRUS 1949 Vol. 4. p. 131.

Governments...known as the Atlantic Pact." The oppositionist's main argument against Italy was that its military forces were insignificant and would drain alliance military resources. Moreover, this was compounded by what critics considered a record of historical unreliability as an alliance partner. "In two world wars Italy has shown herself to be an...undependable ally, having switched sides in both wars," said Acheson. Yet, the arguments for Italy's inclusion were even more important because Italy had been aligned with the West, and Italy's exclusion from this important alliance would adversely affect the incumbent government in future elections. Furthermore, it would increase the Italian Communist Party's influence in Italy.⁷

Acheson expressed these same arguments for and against Italy to President Truman. The Executive Branch decided to support the inclusion of Italy as a member of the North Atlantic Pact. This resulted in the other participating governments supporting this position too, except for faint

⁷Telegram sent from the Italian Ambassador in the United States (Tarchiani) to the Secretary of State, March 1, FRUS 1949. Vol. 4. p. 125.

⁸Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 279.

⁹Memorandum by the Secretary of State Acheson, March 2, FRUS 1949 Vol. 4. p. 142.

¹⁰Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 17-18. See also Memorandum by the Secretary of State Acheson, March 2, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 145.

reservations by Britain. Nevertheless, it was agreed by all to invite Italy as a signatory to the Treaty.⁶³

Resolving the membership of the Scandinavian countries was of critical importance strategically to the alliance. Their membership was stifled by Sweden's suggestion for a Scandinavian defensive pact consisting of Sweden, Norway and Denmark.⁶⁴ This would have been a fatal blow to the Atlantic alliance because of the loss of strategic air and submarine facilities, and the island possessions of Denmark (Greenland) and Norway (Spitzbergen Archipelago).⁶⁵ The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that this type of pact was unable to deter the Soviet Union; therefore, "it [was] extremely doubtful if action in accordance with such a pact...could be successful in preventing Soviet aggression and eventual domination."⁶⁶

Moreover, a key factor for the Scandinavian defensive pact was arms support from the United States and Britain. It was made clear to the Scandinavian countries that no arms support would be forthcoming from either the United States or Britain

⁶³Minutes of the fifteenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security March 4, FRUS 1949, Vol 4. p. 151.

⁶⁴Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 197.

⁶⁵Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State, February 10, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 98.

⁶⁶Study on the military implications to the United States of a Scandinavian Pact, in a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, February 10, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 99.

if they remained outside a North Atlantic alliance. Norway decided to join the North Atlantic Pact in early March. Consequently, the Scandinavian defensive pact fell apart; this resulted in Denmark's insistence on joining the North Atlantic pact and Sweden opting to resolve her own security problems.

Portugal's ascension to membership in the North Atlantic pact was less difficult than that of the others. As previously discussed, the Azores islands were of strategic interest to the United States. Portugal, however, held reservations that they were possibly being used for convenience's sake. The alliance members made assurances that this was not the case. Portugal also inquired if its colonial territories would be covered by the Treaty. The Portuguese were told that if areas outside the territorial scope of the treaty were threatened this would warrant consultations on these matters according to Article 4 of the Treaty. Portugal was appeased on this matter and was willing to join the alliance.⁸

For Greece and Turkey it was concluded that they should not be invited into the alliance because it was considered

⁸Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 198. See Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 26-27. And Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 83-89.

⁸⁸Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 26. See also translated memorandum from the Ambassador in Portugal to the Secretary of State, March 9, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 182.

that the boundaries would then have been extended to the extreme. Greece, Turkey and Iran, however, were significant strategic areas for the United States and Britain. These countries could assist in stopping the encroachment of communism in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. An initial proposal by the United States and Britain was to have the North Atlantic Pact make a declaration stating that threats in these areas would be of grave concern for the pact. This idea was opposed by the other members of the pact.⁶⁹

The United States and Britain discussed the idea of making a joint declaration, but these proposals were also dismissed because of their differing views on Iran. Bevin believed that a joint declaration would cause the Soviets to possibly invoke the 1921 Treaty with Iran and invade Azerbaijan. It was agreed then that they would make separate declarations on this issue.⁷⁰ On March 17, the Ambassadors' Committee, now consisting of the eight participating states (Norway being a participant since March 4) sent invitations to Italy, Portugal, Denmark, and Iceland to be signatories to the Treaty.⁷¹

⁶⁹Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 21-22.

⁷⁰Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 105-107. See also Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 21-24.

⁷¹See Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 279. See also minutes of the eighteenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15, FRUS 1949, Vol. 4. p. 223.

G. SIGNING OF THE TREATY: AGREEMENT NOT LIMITED TO ATLANTIC IN VIEW OF ITS WORLD-WIDE INFLUENCE

On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty.⁷³ In President Truman's address during the signing ceremonies, he had specifically mentioned that the Treaty did not limit the United States security concerns to the Atlantic region only, but was also significant for "the security and welfare of other areas of the world."⁷⁴ Britain's Foreign Minister expressed the same opinion, that the Atlantic pact "does not minimize either our interest or determination to support others not included in this pact."⁷⁴

Interestingly enough, Britain and the United States were the only countries that made statements concerning security problems outside the territorial scope of the Treaty. These statements were clearly attempts to address the out-of-area concerns of both countries. In other words, the out-of-area problem was not resolved during the negotiating phase of the Treaty.

⁷³Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years, p. 120.

⁷⁴President Truman's address, reprinted in New York Times, April 5, 1949.

⁷⁴Full text of Ernest Bevin's address reprinted in, New York Times, April 5, 1949.

III. HISTORICAL CHANGES AND POLITICAL DISPUTES ON OUT-OF-AREA ISSUES: TWO MIDDLE EAST CASE STUDIES

As indicated in the previous chapter the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact did not, by any means, resolve the out-of-area question. Moreover, intra-NATO disputes on the question were exacerbated by the United States implementation of NSC-68 in 1950 and the escalation of the Cold War. As prescribed by NSC-68, U.S "containment" efforts were expanded through a search for global security arrangements that would, it was hoped, curtail or contain Soviet expansionism. This eventually led to such collective defense arrangements as the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

The United States was undoubtedly concerned with non-European security issues. But the implementation of United States policies was complicated because specific features of its national security policies were at times burdened by various conflicting motives. This was mainly caused by the diverse approaches in each American presidential administration's implementation of containment. Consequently, the United States ability to co-ordinate out-of-area

operations was affected by intermittent conflicts between anti-colonialist and anti-communist goals.

The previous chapter indicated that the strategic interests of the West in the Middle East region were of significant importance to the "big three" (the United States, Britain, and France). This point will be explained further by discussing the "big three's" pattern of defending collective interests in the region, and evaluating some of the reasons for their difficulty in developing a common foreign policy and pursuing joint Alliance action in dealing with extra-European contingencies, particularly in the Middle East region.

Three factors will be examined that demonstrated NATO's inability to develop a common foreign policy to defend Western interests, specifically for the Middle East region. First, we will discuss the problems with the consultation process among the NATO partners. NATO clearly designed Articles 4 and 9 to address any issue that required the attention of the allies, particularly for territories not covered by the Washington Treaty. These articles imply that each member has an obligation to consult with its allies on any issue that affects its national security and that of the allies.

⁷⁵For historical background, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). See also Douglas Stuart, "The Future of the European Alliance: Problems and Opportunities for Coalition Strategies," Collective Security in Europe and Asia, ed., Gary L. Guertner, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., U.S. Army War College, 1992).

However, the treaty does not obligate any member to defend a territory outside NATO's geographic zone. Because of this, the consultation process between NATO partners was typically superseded by unilateral actions by one or more of the "big three" members involved in out-of-area campaigns, particularly in the selected cases examined in this thesis.

Second, we will discuss the patterns of intervention by the NATO partners. In fact, the "big three" have intervened repeatedly in the Middle East since NATO's formation in 1949. This process of interventions has formed a distinct pattern since that time. In the first twenty years of NATO the European allies were the dominant power brokers in the Middle East, while the United States was either a part time associate (as in its 1958 intervention in Lebanon and Jordan when the Western powers were trying to resist pan-Arabism and thus protect both countries' sovereignty) or a critical bystander (as in the 1956 Suez Crisis). During this first stage the Europeans repeatedly solicited American support for out-of-area campaigns in the Middle East region. However, the European requests typically resulted in a United States refusal because of America's anticolonial sentiments.

By the 1973 Yom Kippur War, however, the United States and its European allies had shifted interventionist roles. In this second stage the United States became the major solicitor for assistance in out-of-area campaigns, while its European allies usually declined to participate. One of the major

reasons for the European retrenchment was the loss of colonies in Africa and the withdrawal of forces from the Persian Gulf region, particularly in the British case. This shift in interventionist roles resulted in America becoming the dominant power in protecting the security needs of the West in the Middle East.

Third, we will discuss the effects of U.S. anticolonial sentiments on Alliance relations. American urgings that the European allies decolonize became a political issue during World War II. Anticolonial sentiment caused the U.S. to disassociate itself from European colonial problems. This policy of disassociation was, however, set aside if a European ally's colonial possessions were threatened by communist aggression. U.S. anticolonialism nonetheless caused constant frictions between the allies, particularly in the first twenty years of NATO. Nevertheless, an important fact remains: despite the allies' inability to harmonize their political objectives in out-of-Europe contingencies, one or more of the big three intervened repeatedly in the Middle East in defense of perceived security interests.

With this history in mind, the question is posed: should NATO assume an additional role in protecting the West's interests in the Middle East? To illustrate NATO's historical problems in this domain, we will examine two Middle East conflicts, the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, because each case involved one or more of the big three.

These two cases demonstrate the shift between the big three in interventionist roles in out-of-area campaigns. The American position changed from opposing to supporting out-of-area action, while the Europeans changed from supporting to opposing out-of-area action. The activities of the United States, Britain, and France are emphasized in this study mainly because of each nation's high level of involvement in out-of-area conflicts. The roles of other alliance partners are discussed as applicable.

A. ARTICLES 4 AND 9: AGREED INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSULTATION PROCESS

Undoubtedly, one of the major accomplishments of NATO was the institutionalization of the interallied consultation process as directed by Articles 4 and 9. Article 4 specifically addressed the consultation issues: "The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."⁷⁶ Furthermore, to alleviate any ambiguity during the Washington Exploratory Talks, it was agreed that consultation was "applicable in the event of a threat in any part of the world...including a

⁷⁶The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), p. 376.

threat to the security of their overseas territories."⁷⁷ For obvious reasons this article was a safeguard to allow alliance consultations on territorial concerns outside the European theater and thus broaden the defensive domain of the Treaty beyond the North Atlantic area. The implications of Article 4 merely reinforced the world-wide security interests of the NATO members.⁷⁸ Article 4 was a deterrence mechanism against possible Soviet intervention against NATO countries and their out-of-Europe territories. Article 9 established a Council to consider all matters concerned by implementation of the treaty. The North Atlantic Council and its subcommittees institutionalized NATO's consultation process.⁷⁹

In essence, how was the consultation process supposed to function? Consultation was a process of keeping NATO members informed by "regularly exchanging" information on a confidential basis that pertained to any ally (for example,

⁷⁷Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 15, FRUS, 1949 Vol. 4. p. 223.

⁷⁸Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 310. See also, Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 165.

⁷⁹North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts and Figures, p. 377. For further explanation see, Henrikson, The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, p. 310. And, Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 164-165. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), p. 20.

the Suez Crisis or the Yom Kippur War).⁸⁰ In this way consultations would enhance political cooperation and coordination and permit the allies to participate in policy and strategy formulation. Consultation was intended to provide the desired result of developing common policies on particular security concerns. It was a way for the allies to put policies together before taking unilateral actions. Unfortunately, on many occasions, the allies found this type of consultation procedure to be cumbersome, slow, or ineffective. In fact, the allies preferred to consult on an informal basis through bilateral or multilateral diplomatic channels instead of through the NATO process. According to Sherwood,

...NATO has wisely eschewed formal cooperation beyond Europe, fearing that it would overburden the partnership and unnecessarily limit the autonomy of its members. Instead, the allies have relied on an ad hoc, informal approach to the management of developments outside the treaty area. The organizing principle has been the members with the interest, the will, and the capability to take action beyond Europe in defense of Western interests should do so, and that, where possible, they should coordinate with one another.⁸¹

⁸⁰NATO does not have any institutions expressly dedicated to crises developing outside the territorial scope of the Treaty. See Elizabeth D. Sherwood, The Out-Of-Area Debate: The Atlantic Alliance and Challenges Beyond Europe (Santa Monica: Rand, 1985), p. 1. NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 185. See also, Thomas J. Kennedy, JR., NATO Politico-Military Consultation: Shaping Alliance Decisions, (Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1984), pp. 7-8.

⁸¹Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 4.

This analysis clearly illustrated that the NATO partners preferred to form a coalition of the willing by the informal, rather than the formal, consultations process. Sherwood added that the informal consultation process, in fact, has produced the most out-of-area cooperation among the allies.

Other commentators have pointed out that informal consultations have caused problems in coordinating out-of-area cooperation.³² In the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, a problem with secret informal consultations was that all allies did not agree to the planned action; the United States, which was not consulted, objected to the intervention when it took place. A general theme in NATO out-of-area disputes has been that either inadequate or no consultations occurred within the intra-Alliance forum before one or more of the allies had taken action in a crisis. Participants in such matters typically suggested that time did not permit allied participation in the formulation of strategy. Formal alliance consultation would have interrupted the development of national security policies.

Most commentators agree that the formal consultation process has limited value in out-of-area contingencies. Marc Bentinck, has suggested that, even if full consultations were conducted, it would not necessarily mean that the outcome

³²Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance: Global Implications, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), pp. 99-131.

would be a common foreign policy. Sherwood has added that "[t]he sixteen members can barely manage to reach agreement on issues pertaining to European defense..." let alone on resolving extra-European security issues.³³ Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the symbolism of the North Atlantic Council as showing the solidarity of the West could be useful if agreement were possible on out-of-area questions. Yet consultation procedures were not the main problem among the allies. In fact, out-of-area disputes were caused less by consultation breakdowns than by allied differences over defining the threat in a particular region.³⁴

B. INTERVENTION AND REGIONAL SECURITY: A PROBLEM OF THREAT ASSESSMENT

Defining the threat in the Middle East has typically troubled the allies, because the threat could have different implications for each country. For example, in the 1956 Suez Crisis Britain and France had different reasons to invade Egypt. However, both countries agreed that the main issue was

³³Bentinck, "NATO's Out-of-Area Problem," pp. 19-23. See also Sherwood, The Out-of-Area Debate, p. 9.

³⁴Sherwood explains that "[t]he roadblocks to cooperation are not procedural but substantive. Moreover, to the extent that imperfect consultations are a cause of the problem, it is not at all clear that new institutional mechanisms would be the solution. Cooperation evolves on a case-by-case basis, determined by mutual interests, rather than because of some abstract commitment to consult or perfect procedural arrangements." See Sherwood, The Out-Of-Area Debate, pp. 1-22.

the removal of Abdel Nasser from power. Since NATO's inception one or more of the "big three" has been involved in all of the major Middle East conflicts. There have been two major security reasons for Western interest in this area: (1) to maintain the flow of oil supplies to the industrialized economies and (2) to minimize Soviet influence in the area.

Another factor that has affected allied ability to intervene in the Middle East has been European "entente" with the Arab nations. This factor has allowed the British, French, and Italians in particular certain privileges in their relations with specific Arab nations. These unique relations have been used on various occasions to compensate for U.S. foreign policy errors in the region. On other occasions, however, the insular nature of the European-Arab entente has been used to secure the flow of oil to Western Europe alone, as during the Yom Kippur War.

As explained earlier, the interventionist roles of the Americans and the Europeans shifted during the late 1960s and early 1970s. America's reluctance to participate in Middle Eastern contingencies in the early years of NATO established a precedent for years to come. The Europeans were willing to intervene in pursuing their interests, particularly in the Middle East, but the Americans disassociated themselves from such ventures. Some observers contend that U.S. containment

³⁵See Bentinck, NATO's Out-Of-Area Problems, pp. 44-45.

doctrine was damaged by America's dogged anticolonial policies. From this perspective, the conflicting national security policies of the United States encouraged the Europeans to retrench from their global responsibilities and left America as the major defender of the West's world-wide security interests. In other words, it is argued that alliance intervention co-ordination in the Middle East started on a poor foundation, and the United States did most of the structural damage because of the influence of anticolonialism.

C. U.S. ANTCOLONIAL SENTIMENTS: THEIR LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS

U.S. anticolonial sentiment had a detrimental effect on transatlantic relations when out-of-area contingencies were at issue during the early years of NATO. In fact, American judgements about U.S. national interests were ambivalent and divided. On the one hand, America clearly had taken the best interests of colonial dependent peoples forward by advocating the eventual independence of European colonies. On the other hand, American national interests were strictly against turning such colonies over to communist sympathizers.

These cross-currents and conflicting motives caused a severe backlash in NATO's out-of-area disputes by the late 1960's. America clearly supported its European allies when it was decided that keeping a colonial possession under European tutelage maintained regional stability. The Americans

nonetheless assailed the Europeans for their unwillingness to forgo their imperialistic past and urged decolonization. For the United States the former policy was a realistic national security position for maintaining regional stability on behalf of the West. However, the latter point was an excellent national policy position to champion when a colonial dependency was strategically insignificant.⁵⁶

As the Cold War heightened, anti-imperialism became less of an issue, and "it left little room for an anticolonialism that had no base in pragmatic considerations."⁵⁷ The United States was extremely concerned about anti-Western and communist-supported nationalist movements emerging in its allies' colonial territories. Consequently, for national security reasons in some cases continued European colonial rule was favored over the self-determination of peoples whose

⁵⁶"The U.S. government first tried to appeal to nationalist movements in a minimal way while working with the western European Metropolitan powers in long-range, substantive, common programs necessitating close cooperation. Hence, American leadership continued to support the principle of self-determination in public remarks and began quietly pressing its European allies to adopt a process of evolutionary development toward self-government in colonial areas. In return for implementing such a gradualist approach, the United States offered to use its influence, where feasible and appropriate, to moderate the demands of nationalist groups so that they also might accept a slow mode of decolonization. This policy led to an American program of economic stabilization, restoration of international trade, and forward military installations." See Scott L. Bills, "The United States, NATO and the Colonial World," in NATO After Thirty Years, eds., Lawrence S. Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), p. 154

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 150.

leaders were anti-Western or communist sympathizers. For instance, in 1949, United States policy with regard to French North Africa opposed any form of independence for Morocco because policy makers considered that Morocco was too weak and "vulnerable to subsequent domination by communists."⁸⁸ However, the same memorandum stated that the foremost U.S. policy regarding colonies was to advocate the eventual loosening of colonial tutelage; therefore "we should not lose sight of our policy to favor the gradual evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government."⁸⁹ America was thus sending conflicting signals not only to France, but also to the rest of the Alliance's colonial powers.

It appears that American anticolonial policy tended to be guided in three not entirely consistent directions: (1) by opposing the independence of European colonial dependencies that seemed likely to pursue leftist or anti-Western policies; (2) by disassociating the United States from European reactionary colonial policies; and (3) by encouraging European colonial dependencies to avoid leftist or anti-Western policies in their quest for independence. These interrelated motives characterized the conflicting American national security signals of "support plus restraint." In a word, the

⁸⁸See memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, United States Policy with regard to French North Africa, March 22, FRUS 1948 Vol. 3. p. 685.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 687.

United States wanted its allies to decolonize, but for global stability reasons America tacitly supported allies in maintaining strategic colonial possessions. These conflicting American foreign policies have been major problematic issues for the allies during consultations on out-of-Europe security interests. To define it more accurately, these conflicting signals typically entailed the United States intervening in the affairs of its NATO partners in colonies or the United States disassociating itself from these colonial problems.¹⁰

Ostensibly, the United States deemed it prudent for its own national security interests to have a NATO member in control of certain colonial territories rather than an anti-Western or communist-supported government. The European allies were reluctant to abandon their colonial possessions and resisted American attempts to persuade them to do so. This was an important theme during the first 20 years of NATO in the out-of-area debate. The Europeans tried to gain American backing for out-of-area campaigns while resisting anticolonial criticisms from the United States.¹¹

In the late 1960s the Americans increased their global activities, while the European allies decolonized and retrenched from global intervention. This factor put the

¹⁰See Bills, "The United States, NATO and the Colonial World," p. 155. See also, Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance, p. 12.

¹¹Stuart and Tow, The Limits of the Alliance, p. 19.

United States in the position of seeking support in its out-of-area ventures while the Europeans turned "America's old strict constructionist arguments against the alliance leader now that they had been per force relieved of their over seas responsibilities."⁹²

Unquestionably, the United States was feeling the economic strain of containment, which caused it to solicit Western European assistance to share the burden in the world-wide East-West confrontation. Coupled with this issue was the problem of defining the threat in out-of-area contingencies. These fundamental transitional trends were key elements in determining if one or more of the alliance members had the will to intervene in a specific out-of-area campaign.⁹³ The following two Middle Eastern case studies will provide an overall explanation of the aforementioned factors affecting the out-of-area problem.

D. THE SUEZ CRISIS

The West's policy in the Middle East helped to cause the wave of pan-Arabism in the Middle East. Egypt's President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was emerging as the predominant leader in the Arab world. His anti-Western views stemmed from the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (Britain, France, and the

⁹²Ibid., p. 19.

⁹³Ibid., p. 19.

United States), which regulated the amount of arms sales to the Middle East region from the West. This resulted in Nasser's solicitation of arms from the East in 1955, which produced his first shipment from Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Nasser objected to the Baghdad Pact because this gave Iraq Western support for leadership in the Arab world. Nasser's irritation with the West climaxed when the United States withdrew its proposal to finance the Aswan Dam project. This resulted in Nasser unilaterally nationalizing the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956.¹⁴

What followed after Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was the most intensely contested out-of-area dispute since the birth of NATO. Britain and France saw Nasser's unilateral act as a direct "challenge to their power and influence".¹⁵ Britain was absolutely outraged with Nasser's action for two reasons: 1) Nasser's action was a direct strike at a British "imperialist legacy," so London had to act decisively or face the consequences of instability in the rest

¹⁴Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), pp. 18-21. See Also, NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 47. The essence of the tripartite declaration of May 1950 was an attempt to regulate the flow of arms and to stabilize the territorial delimitation between Israel and Jordan. This was a direct response to the U.N lifting the arms embargo in 1949. See Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Postwar Imperialism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 583. Herbert G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 116.

¹⁵Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West, p. 19.

of its colonial territories; and 2) the Suez Canal was symbolic of British national pride and critical for the maintenance of trade routes and oil imports. Under no uncertain terms, Britain was ready for war if it could not negotiate a solution to the Suez Canal crisis and bring "Nasser to his senses." France was even more adamant about the problem. France's Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, "argued that the West should react promptly and in strength."⁹⁶ France supported Britain because it believed that Nasser was supporting subversive actions of the National Liberation Front in Algeria, and France was willing to assist in removing Nasser from power. Eisenhower strongly believed that the Suez Canal and the Nasser problem should not be exclusively dealt with by the big three. The United States position was one of moderation to forestall any attempt of military action by Britain or France.⁹⁷

The United States was led to believe that Britain and France relegated the idea of "immediate use of force to the background,"⁹⁸ because a tripartite statement was made on August 2, 1956, proposing a conference of affected nations to

⁹⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1951, (New York: Doubleday & Company, INC, 1965), pp. 35-36.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 37.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 38.

resolve this matter.⁹⁹ This American assumption was the background to one of major miscalculations in the entire affair. On 28 July 1956, the British and French had started to develop secret military plans to invade Egypt.¹⁰⁰ This conspiracy breached the special relationship between London and Washington.

In October 1956 Britain and France implemented their war plan. However, after intense political and economic pressure from the United States, a cease fire was ordered in November.¹⁰¹ On December 11-12, 1956, the North Atlantic Council convened, and the Suez Crisis was addressed by the members. The United States was supported by Italy, Germany, and the Scandinavian nations in criticizing the actions of Britain and France.¹⁰² They expressed the view that the

⁹⁹ Tripartite statement on the nationalization of the Universal Suez Canal Company, issued at London by the government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, August 2, 1956. See, Department of State Publication, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1956, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 607.

¹⁰⁰ Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 14-15. See also, William B. Quandt, "U.S-Soviet Rivalry in the Middle East," in East-West Tensions in the Third World, ed., Marshall D. Shulman (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1986), p. 30-32. Secret military meeting had taken place on July 28, 1956 without consulting with the U.S., see Donald Neff, Warriors At Suez, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), p. 289.

¹⁰¹ Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account, (New York: Mayflower Books, INC., 1978), p. 235. See also Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, pp. 82-84.

¹⁰² Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance, p. 60.

Israeli, British, and French use of armed force was not provoked or justified because these countries had not exhausted peaceful means to resolve the problem.¹⁰³ The Anglo-French armed action against Egypt not only harmed relations with the African and Asian nations, but also fragmented the harmony and solidarity of the alliance. Norway's Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, commented that "the British and French action in Egypt" caused mistrust because of the "lack of consultation and disregard of [the] NATO treaty."¹⁰⁴ This poor co-ordination of national policies jeopardized the solidarity of the alliance.

The Suez Canal crisis essentially caused a rift between the Anglo-French governments and the United States. It also

¹⁰³This was the general consensus of the statements made during the NAC meetings but also a paraphrase of a statement by Norway's Foreign Minister. Belgium deplored the fact that smaller alliance nations were faced with having to choose between the UK and France, on the one hand, and the US, on the other. Denmark was also disappointed in the Anglo-French action but refrained from public criticism. The Netherlands was conciliatory and indicated that the Anglo-French motives were not dishonorable because they were not interested in any material gain nor had they threatened Egypt's independence. See Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Ministerial meeting to the Department of State, December 11, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 4. p. 107. See also, Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Ministerial meeting to the Department of State, December 12, in *ibid.*, p. 116-122. in *ibid.*, p. 117 Belgian position: in *ibid.*, p. 119, Danish position: in *ibid.*, p. 119, Greek position: in *ibid.*, p. 120, Dutch position.

¹⁰⁴Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State, December 11, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 4. p. 107, for Norway's position.

caused the London and Paris governments to lose influence and prestige world-wide, but specifically in the Middle East region. Thus, the Anglo-French intervention harmed the West's position in the Middle East and allowed the Soviet Union to become influential with the most powerful Arab leader of the time, Nasser.¹⁰⁵ Kaplan has suggested that the Suez Canal crisis symbolizes the complete breakdown of NATO's political consultation process. Moreover, the consultation process was identified as a problem in May 1956 by Secretary-General Lord Ismay, who authorized "The Committee of Three," a group formed to evaluate NATO's role in non-military matters. As Kaplan puts it, "NATO was in serious trouble when its three major constituents were so mistrustful of each other."¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, Henry Kissinger suggests that the United States policy during this entire affair was a major mistake because:

In 1956, when faced with this choice during the British and French attempt to seize the Suez Canal, the United States imposed its own assessment on its allies. While dubious about British and French military plans, I had bitterly opposed Eisenhower Administration policy then. I have always believed that many of our later difficulties have stemmed from our insensitive conduct toward our allies at that time, which both stimulated a long-festered resentment and fostered a sense of impotence that accelerated their withdrawal from overseas commitments and added to American burdens.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵Bentinck, "NATO's Out-Of-Area Problem," p. 15. See also Sherwood, Allies In Crisis, pp. 88-89.

¹⁰⁶Kaplan, NATO and the United States, pp. 68-69.

¹⁰⁷Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1982), p. 708.

The United States was unwilling to participate in this venture. In fact, the Americans completely disassociated themselves from the colonial European allies. This break in co-operation and political solidarity was a pervasive element that caused some Western Europeans to resent subsequent United States attempts to solicit support in out-of-area ventures. Yet the Committee of Three attempted to provide some measures to avoid another debacle like the Suez Crisis.

For the alliance, deep lessons were learned from the Suez Crisis, and the timely report in December 1956 by NATO's Committee of Three on non-military cooperation (the "Three Wise Men" —Lester Pearson of Canada, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Gaetano Martino of Italy) recommended actions "for strengthening [NATO's] internal solidarity, cohesion and unity."¹⁰⁸ These recommendations were established to assist NATO members to work out various disputes on economic and political co-operation based on the premise of frequent consultation. The Committee asserted that it was "a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy." The report

¹⁰⁸Report of the Committee of Three on non-military cooperation in NATO, Submitted to and approved by the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, December 11-14, 1956 Department of State Publication, American Foreign Policy 1956, p. 374.

further argued that without consultation "the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy."¹¹¹

In view of this, the committee believed that alliance members must consult on such matters as problems beyond Europe:

NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the treaty area.¹¹²

The Wise Men report was criticized by Britain's Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, who noted that the United Kingdom had world-wide responsibilities and that, "if consultation proposals meant that every member was given the right to criticize and obstruct every decision, not much will be accomplished."¹¹³ The United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, mentioned that consultation would interrupt the flow of foreign policy implementation, and cautioned that it would be attempted within reason. He added that consultation was an obstacle and "limits our constitutional processes," and that for this reason, "literal application [was] not possible."¹¹⁴ Pineau stated that efforts to harmonize the

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 381-382.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 379.

¹¹²Telegram from the United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting to the Department of State December 13, FRUS 1955-57, Vol. 4. p. 140.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 141.

foreign policies of NATO members, particularly for regions beyond Europe, must be sound, and that "this point should be cleared up if we wish to avoid difficulties for the Secretary General."¹¹³

Nevertheless, all members agreed that the lack of consultation during the Suez Crisis had caused inter-alliance problems that had escalated to unprecedented heights. This crisis was, however, only one of many conflicts in the Middle East involving NATO members. In the following case we will consider whether the Suez Canal Crisis was indeed a stepping stone to improved alliance out-of-area co-operation in the Middle East region.

E. 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR

By 1973, the European NATO allies were in a period of world-wide retrenchment. The British had relinquished most of their military positions in the Middle East because of budget constraints, while the United States was in the process of disengagement from Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, the members of the Atlantic Alliance maintained vital interests in the Middle East, despite divergent foreign policies, particularly between the United States and its European partners. A major problem was caused by the differing national policies toward Israel after the 1967 Six Day War. The Western Europeans

¹¹³Ibid., p. 143.

asserted that Israel should return to its pre-war borders, whereas the United States argued for maintaining the status quo.¹¹⁴

Governments on both sides of the Atlantic feared that the possibility of escalating hostility would inevitably affect vital oil supplies. Therefore, it was in Western European interests to avoid jeopardizing relations with Arab nations. On the other hand, the United States favored a policy of supporting and guaranteeing the democratic state of Israel's existence. In view of these complications over this out-of-area problem, we can look back and see the making of a "Suez in Reverse."

When the Yom Kippur War erupted on October 6, 1973, the Western European allies acted in a fashion comparable to that of the United States during the Suez Crisis. The war in the Middle East caused disagreements between the United States and its allies over the following questions: the United States military resupply of Israel, the use of American bases in NATO countries, the possibilities of an oil embargo, and the United States policies toward the Soviet Union. The Western Europeans attempted to disassociate "themselves from the US in the Middle East" and by doing so, "our Allies may think they protect their immediate economic interests, but only at great

¹¹⁴ Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 135. See also, Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance, p. 80. And, Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 708.

long term cost."¹¹⁵ On both sides of the Atlantic the allies were set in their policies toward the Yom Kippur War. No policies were more controversial, however, than the United States decision to resupply Israel's military arsenal.

Kissinger was reluctant in the early days of the war to submit to Israel's insistence for massive United States military aid. It was assumed in Washington that Israel would easily conclude this war, as in 1967. But in the days that followed, Israel revealed that it had taken substantial losses and needed immediate assistance or the state of Israel was in imminent danger of being defeated. On October 9, 1973, General Aharon Yariv reported on Israeli television the loss of fifty aircraft and hundreds of tanks.¹¹⁶ Kissinger was informed earlier that day by Israel's Ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, of the grim news of the military disaster. The United States agreed to give Israel full support in its fight against Egypt and Syria.¹¹⁷ A massive airlift of material was shipped from America to Israel, and the European allies were outraged because of this action.

¹¹⁵A statement made by Richard Nixon to Willy Brandt, cited in Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 716.

¹¹⁶See Chaim Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East, (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 255.

¹¹⁷Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 491-495.

The use of NATO air bases to resupply Israel was critical to the United States airlift mission.¹¹⁸ Therefore, Washington argued that it was equally important for its allies to support the supply efforts. In principle the allies rejected the United States resupply policy for Israel, except for Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States encountered major resistance from Britain and France. William P. Bundy explained the underlying mechanism that generally influenced European policy during the Yom Kippur War: "the [European] allies cared more about their oil supplies than they did about working with US policy."¹¹⁹ Hence, NATO's parallel dimensions and common interests were overshadowed by Western Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

For example, France continued arms sales to Arab states during the crisis in accordance with its pro-Arab policies since 1967.¹²⁰ France's Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, accelerated the disassociation by "[a]ttacking the United States for fraternizing with Brezhnev while both sides were pouring arms into the area."¹²¹ The French position was not

¹¹⁸Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 138.

¹¹⁹William P. Bundy, "Western Crisis and Consensus Experience," U.S. Naval War College Review, (November/December 1984), Vol. 37, p. 47.

¹²⁰Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 138.

¹²¹Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 537.

a surprise to the United States, but Britain's opposition sent shocks through Washington. As Sherwood puts it, "[t]he British made it known that they did not want their bases in England or on Cyprus to be used either for the airlift or intelligence collection," an action that simply infuriated Washington.¹²² In the early stages of the crisis the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) supported the United States resupply efforts to Israel. However, with the heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the FRG was concerned about jeopardizing the progress of its *Ostpolitik* campaign. Consequently, the FRG banned United States military flights over its territory on October 22, 1973.¹²³ This resulted in United States military aircraft having to make a 2,000-mile detour to reach Israel, because Spain (then not a member of NATO) also denied the United States use of its bases for Middle East operations. Furthermore, Turkey and then Greece subsequently announced that NATO bases on their soil were for NATO operations only.

Portugal, a reluctant partner, allowed the United States to use base facilities for resupplying Israel. At first Portugal resisted United States requests for use of Lajes airfield in the Azores. However, Portugal then attempted to

¹²²Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 139. See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 709.

¹²³Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 709. See also Stuart and Tow, Limits of Alliance, pp. 267-268.

use those facilities as leverage to gain U.S. military aid for its ventures in Mozambique and Angola. Kissinger gave Portugal an ultimatum to agree to certain terms or be left to defend itself alone in this "hostile world." The next day, on October 13, 1973, the United States was granted permission to use Lajes airfield.¹²⁴ The Netherlands also supported the United States, but their location was off the route for the airlift.

By October 15, the United States airlift to Israel was in full operation. The Arab oil producers reacted to the United States airlift by unilaterally reducing oil production by five percent. This was to be followed by greater cutbacks until Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders. This initial action was the beginning of the oil crisis that completely stopped shipments to the United States and the Netherlands. For the Western Europeans the fear of Arab oil production cut-backs increased their efforts to distance themselves from the United States.¹²⁵ The European policy of not jeopardizing entente with the Arab nations was indeed relatively successful. As Robert J. Lieber explained, France and Britain were exempt

¹²⁴Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 520. And, Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 139.

¹²⁵Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 537.

from cuts, and the European Community (EC) members would have a five percent reduction each month.¹²⁶

During the cease-fire talks on October 24, the United Nations Security Council negotiations came to a significant confrontation when Moscow gave the United States an ultimatum that suggested a joint superpower peacekeeping force in the Middle East. Moscow added that if the United States did not submit to the ultimatum "appropriate steps unilaterally" would have to be taken. Washington was outraged over the Soviet overtures, but was prepared to agree to an international force other than the superpowers. Kissinger candidly remarked that "[t]here was no question in my mind that we would have to reject the Soviet proposal."¹²⁷ Meanwhile, the United States detected increased Soviet military activity in the Mediterranean Sea and responded by placing its military forces on a world-wide alert. The American forces alert status was upgraded to the highest stage of peacetime readiness: Defense Condition III (DEFCON). The United States action was unilaterally taken without consultation with the NATO allies. The British, however, were informed of the United States world-wide alert posture shortly after DEFCON III was in effect. The West Europeans reacted quickly to distance themselves from the United States actions. The FRG reaffirmed

¹²⁶Robert J. Lieber, The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West, (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 17.

¹²⁷Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 584.

its position that its territory would not be a military staging ground for United States out-of-area contingencies. The other Western European allies followed suit and made similar statements disavowing any connection with the United States escalation of hostilities with Moscow.¹²⁸

The Yom Kippur War and the ensuing increases in oil prices might have been expected to encourage Western Europe and the United States to co-ordinate their Middle East foreign policies. Some commentators argue that the alliance's development of a common policy has been obstructed by the Europeans, who were concerned with maintaining vital oil supplies. Thus, they avoided being victimized by a possible oil embargo and "sought salvation in national unilateralism."¹²⁹ Western Europe criticized the United States for doing the unthinkable, that is, possibly drawing its allies into a United States-Soviet confrontation outside the territorial scope of NATO.¹³⁰

The Western Europeans argued that out-of-area "[t]hreats cannot be dealt with by expanding the geographic scope of NATO to the Middle East." Domestic politics would undoubtedly overrule such a proposition on both sides of the Atlantic. In

¹²⁸Ibid., pp. 583-588; pp. 714-715.

¹²⁹Karl Kaiser, Cesare Merlini, Thierry De Montbrial, William Wallace and Edmund Wellenstein, The European Community: Progress or Decline? (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 26.

¹³⁰Bentinck, "NATO's Out-of-Area Problem," p. 16.

fact, "[a] proposal of this kind is almost impossible to implement, for it is not clear who is to be protected against what."¹³¹ This situation is a clear example of Europe's retrenchment and the reversal of the tactics Washington used in earlier decades in its campaign against out-of-area intervention for colonialist purposes.

Throughout NATO's history Europe has been the center of the East-West conflict. This scenario started to fade in the 1970's with hostilities beyond Europe and around NATO's perimeter, namely the Middle East. The Yom Kippur War was the turning point in the out-of-area debate for the NATO partners because Europe and the United States traded places in their "interventionist and non-interventionist roles in the Middle East."¹³² The global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union started to expand with the escalation of proxy wars, while the European allies retrenched from their once dominant role in global affairs. America started to solicit European assistance in its world-wide struggle against Soviet expansionism, but these pleas were rejected for several reasons. The Europeans remembered American anticolonial sentiments and how the Europeans were rebuffed in their attempts to gain U.S. support in out-of-area campaigns. Moreover, the embarrassment of the Suez Crisis will not be

¹³¹Ibid., p. 27.

¹³²Ibid., p. 15 and 27.

soon forgotten by the British and French. The out-of-area dispute during the Yom Kippur War was an example of the lingering memories of past disputes that have perpetuated the alliance's inability to resolve this problem.

IV. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN
EUROPEAN UNION: A POSSIBLE PARTIAL RESPONSE TO
CONTINGENCIES AFFECTING WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS
OUTSIDE EUROPE

Operations to deal with out-of-area contingencies in the Middle East could possibly be conducted more efficiently through United States-WEU cooperation than under NATO auspices. Case studies supporting this judgement include the Western naval operations in 1987-1988 during the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, and in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf war. This thesis attempts to explain why political decision makers in the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Italy prefer to coordinate political-military responses in a non-NATO framework for contingencies in the Middle East. It also shows how the United States-WEU cooperation framework has, in contrast, been a vehicle for successful campaigns beyond Europe in the past and could possibly provide the answer for such operations in the future.

This thesis begins by discussing the purpose of NATO and the entrenched belief that NATO should remain a European security apparatus rather than become a vehicle, among others, for defending the West's geostrategic interests beyond as well as within Europe. Also, the thesis examines to what extent the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy

contribute toward NATO's inability to formulate a common foreign and security policy for the Middle East region.

The WEU's growing role as a defense institution in Western Europe is also examined, within the context of efforts to develop a European security identity. The thesis concludes that the European pillar of NATO could develop common action under the WEU to defend Western European interests in the Middle East.

Two recent contingencies in the Middle East (that is, the Persian Gulf naval operations in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991) support the argument for a systematic process of coordinating security policies between the United States and the WEU rather than relying on the ad hoc frameworks of the past. Even though these two cases were successful under ad hoc coordination, it may be argued that a United States-WEU framework should be the first choice in future Middle East contingencies. This section is intended to provide insight regarding the debate between the allies during each Gulf Crisis and the possibilities of United States-WEU linkage in responding to future security contingencies in the Middle East.

Last, the thesis discusses some of the problems with United States-WEU co-ordination of politico-military ventures. The overriding advantages of United States-WEU linkage nonetheless outweigh the disadvantages. Therefore, United

States-WEU linkage may be a more practical political framework for contingencies beyond Europe than the NATO framework.

A. NATO'S RATIONALE: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST USING NATO FOR OUT-OF-EUROPE CONTINGENCIES

It has been truly said that the real creator of NATO was Stalin and that his successors contributed to its continuation. However, Josef Joffe and others have argued that United States involvement in Western European political affairs has contributed to a cooperative security relationship in Western Europe for over forty years. As Joffé explained:

...neither the Soviet challenge nor the destruction of the European balance during World War II were powerful enough to prompt the West Europeans to transcend their history. Only the permanent intrusion of the United States into the affairs of the Continent changed the terms of state interaction to the point where West Europeans no longer had to conduct their business in the brooding shadow of violence. By promising to protect Western Europe against others and against itself, the United States swept aside the rules of the self-help game that had governed and regularly brought grief to Europe in centuries past.¹³³

This statement is noteworthy not only because it provides an answer as to why NATO has survived since its inception, but also because of its suggestion that Western Europeans were able to put past historical problems to rest and pursue cooperative interactive relations amongst themselves. As a result, NATO was formed as a counterbalance to the clearly perceived strategic threat from the Soviet Union during

¹³³Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1984), p. 72.

Western Europe's economic recovery and hence prevented European allies from being engulfed into the Soviet empire. Meanwhile, the United States military presence on the continent contributed to Western European reassurance and stability.¹³⁴

NATO was founded as an Alliance of democratic nations that shared common ideals and objectives. This idea was embodied in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, in which the allies expressed a collective obligation to defend each other if any member was attacked by an aggressor. This obligation, however, was not extended to areas outside the geographic scope of the Treaty as outlined in Article 6. Both Articles suggest that the primary mission of the Alliance is ensuring that "military capabilities in the Treaty area are sufficient to maintain an adequate defence posture."¹³⁵ From this premise we can infer that NATO was indeed created to defend Western interests but only in the North Atlantic area.

In regard to the out-of-area debate some commentators have suggested that the Alliance is indeed the best framework for

¹³⁴David S. Yost, The United States and European Security, (Monterey, CA., Naval Postgraduate School, 1992), pp. 4,5 and 78. The reassurance of European allies that Germany will not pursue an autonomous security policy has also been advanced as a rationale for NATO. See the sources cited in David S. Yost, "U.S. Military Power and Alliance Relations," Annals, AAPSS, 517, (September 1991), p. 90. And, Michael Legge, "The Making of NATO's New Strategy," NATO Review, No. 6, (December 1991), p. 9.

¹³⁵Facts and Figures, p. 157.

out-of-area contingencies since it has the military infrastructure to support such operations. For example, Alexander M. Haig, former Secretary of State and former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), argued in 1980 that many security problems concerning the Alliance arise outside the Treaty boundaries and that opposition to using NATO forces for out-of-Europe operations "creates an inflexibility and an artificial constraint on alliance action that will seriously impede the alliance's effectiveness...."¹³⁶

In contrast, other commentators have argued that NATO should not be used as a world-wide military organization in defending the West's interests. This can be attributed to the belief that "key allies" such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy have separate and distinct interests and policy priorities that could be potentially harmful because of the divisive nature of out-of-area issues, as in the Suez Crisis in 1956 or the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In essence, the separate understandings of the major allies about a certain issue may not take into account the political considerations of the smaller allies and could thus foster a divided Alliance.¹³⁷

¹³⁶Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "NATO in the 1980s: The Need for Pragmatic Leadership," in NATO-The Next Thirty Years, ed., Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 441.

¹³⁷Henri Simonet, "Europe and the Alliance in the Next Decade," in NATO-The Next Thirty Years, ed., Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 31-40.

Indeed, NATO is not only a military organization but also a political alliance. Therefore, it takes a significant effort to co-ordinate and harmonize each country's national security interests. Some commentators have suggested that the NATO out-of-area problem could be avoided by possibly developing the WEU as a European defense identity and using it in concert with the United States in joint military contingencies beyond Europe. The reason for this is that the European pillar of NATO could use the "WEU to provide the institutional locus of West European security cooperation."¹³⁸ In a word, this process would allow the European allies to use their military structure to act independently while also maintaining their alliance with the United States.¹³⁹

B. THE WEU—A SECURITY ORGANIZATION WITH GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

Formed in 1948, the WEU has been a longstanding but relatively unknown institution. Its purpose was to be a forum for multilateral security cooperation and thus offer prospects for fruitful solidarity. This framework of multilateral consultations was strengthened in October 1987 when the WEU Ministers adopted the "Platform on European Security

¹³⁸Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, European Security Beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 132.

¹³⁹Edward Mortimer, "Solution in Search of a Problem," Financial Times, October 9, 1990.

Interests." In effect, this document has had profound implications for WEU member countries not only in developing a European security identity, but also in coordinating policies about out-of-area issues.

The "Platform" outlined several objectives that the WEU was attempting to fulfill that related to matters beyond Europe:

- developing a cohesive European security identity and thereby developing solidarity for the harmonization of foreign policies;
- ensuring that the two pillars of the Alliance remain indivisible;
- and, concerting security interests outside Europe.¹⁴⁰

Therefore, the Platform is a significant document in that it further enhances the Brussels Treaty, which already provides a broad basis for co-ordinating policies regarding security matters outside Europe. For example, Article 8 specifically states:

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰William van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," Survival, Vol. 32 No. 6, (November/December 1990), p. 521.

¹⁴¹In 1948 the Brussels Pact was originally formed as an organization designed to deter the "renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression." However, when Germany was permitted to accede to the Brussels Pact the Treaty was modified, see Article II of the 1954 Protocol Modifying and Completing the 1948 Brussels Treaty in, NATO Basic Documents, pp. 56-57.

This article is noteworthy because it implies that members can react to security challenges outside the European continent. In contrast, the NATO Treaty defines a geographic area and because of this fact coordinating out-of-area matters amongst the allies is problematic. The WEU, on the other hand, has no defined geographical limitations, and hence is able to formulate foreign policies beyond Europe in concert with fewer complications. Indeed, the Platform set a standard for co-ordinating security matters beyond Europe. This fact was exemplified during the "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988. Hence, the WEU has a "real advantage to the Alliance in that it offers the potential for concerted action among Europeans or ad hoc cooperation between Europeans and their North American allies."¹⁴²

The 1987 Platform reinforced the Brussels Treaty by reaffirming the WEU's obligation to ensure the defense of "any member country at its borders," as the premise for concerting West European security co-operation, which included "bilateral and regional military co-operation."¹⁴³ Likewise, WEU Secretary-General Willem van Eekelen noted that the Platform

¹⁴² Arnaud Jacomet, "The Role of WEU in the Gulf War," in Western Europe and the Gulf: A study of West European reactions to the Gulf War carried out under the auspices of the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, eds., Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), pp. 159-160.

¹⁴³ Ian Gambles, "Prospects for West European Security Co-operation," Adelphi Papers 244, (Autumn 1989), p. 31.

facilitated the process for members to be more effective in contributing to the West's common security interests outside Europe.¹⁴⁴ By all accounts the Platform was indeed a major document for both sides of the Atlantic. Consequently, the revitalized WEU worked with the United States in safeguarding the West's interests by conducting naval operations in the Persian Gulf during the 1987-1988 tanker war.

Coupled with the Platform the WEU gained momentum in December 1991 with the conclusion of the European Council¹⁴⁵ meeting on the Treaty of European Union. The Maastricht declaration acknowledged the WEU as the security institution of the European Union and as a component for strengthening the European pillar of NATO. The WEU members agreed that the arrangement must be interpreted as a way in which the European pillar can formulate common foreign and security policy and also implement it operationally.¹⁴⁶ The Maastricht declaration noted three key areas that required the WEU to implement its operational capacity:

- developing a WEU planning organization;

¹⁴⁴William van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 520.

¹⁴⁵The European Council brings together Heads of State and Government and the President of the Commission. The European Council discusses questions pertaining both to the European Community and to European Political Cooperation at the highest level. See, A Guide to The European Community, (Published by the E.C. Delegation to the United States, 1991), p. 7.

¹⁴⁶Declaration of the Member States of Western European Union issue on the occasion of the 46th European Council meeting on 9 and 10 December 1991 at Maastricht, p. 1.

- closer cooperation with NATO in the fields of transport, logistics, training, and strategic surveillance;
- and disposition of military units answerable to the WEU.¹⁴⁷

What is noteworthy about the idea of the WEU becoming the defense arm of the European political union is the fact that all of the members belong not only to the European Community (EC) but also to NATO. Because of this, it has been argued that the WEU should become the bridge between NATO and the EC in consolidating foreign and security policy.¹⁴⁸ Before the Maastricht declaration many commentators were skeptical of the WEU becoming the defense arm of the EC. However, this argument waned during the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and 1991 when the WEU again excelled in co-ordinating Europe's military contribution.¹⁴⁹

To assess the role of the WEU as a functioning security institution its involvement in two case studies (the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991) is discussed. This portion of the thesis attempts to demonstrate the usefulness of the WEU-United States linkage in co-ordinating foreign and

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁴⁸"The Defence of Europe," Financial Times, October 31, 1991.

¹⁴⁹Hans Binnendijk, "How NATO + EC + WEU Can Equal Security for Europeans," International Herald Tribune, April 2, 1991. And see, "NATO Calls for WEU to be EC's Defence Arm," Financial Times, February 19, 1991.

security policy to defend the West's interests in the Middle East.

C. THE FIRST UNITED STATES-WEU AD HOC CO-ORDINATED
OPERATION: THE "TANKER WAR" OF 1987-1988

The origins of the "tanker war" date back to May 1984, when Iraq declared a 50-mile war zone radius around the Iranian port of Kharg Island and began making strikes against oil tankers making port calls. Iran responded by attacking any shipping making port calls to the Arab Gulf nations. These actions caused understandable alarm in the international community. However, the major oil-consuming nations learned to live with these inconveniences.¹⁵⁰ From 1980 to 1986 the Iran-Iraq war was remarkably contained. The stalemate between the two adversaries posed no major threat to other countries in the region or to the vital oil resources.

Events rapidly changed when attacks on oil tankers began to escalate in late 1986.¹⁵¹ In fact, Kuwait (a logistical

¹⁵⁰Congressional Quarterly Inc., The Middle East, 6th ed. (Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1986), p. 92. For an account of the Iran-Iraq war see, Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers Ltd., 1988).

¹⁵¹According to The Economist, "Since 1984 Iran and Iraq between them have hit about 250 ships, including more than 180 tankers. Iraq—which has no tanker traffic to be attacked, because its ports have been inaccessible since the war began in 1980—now gets many of its imports through Kuwait. To punish Kuwait for this and for subsidizing Iraq's war effort, Iran has for several months been concentrating its attacks on ships using Kuwait's port." See, "The Stakes in the Tanker

supporter of Iraq) was specifically targeted by Iran. For this reason, the Kuwaiti government sought relief from Iranian hostility. What caused the increase of Western involvement was the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company's request for the United States, the Soviet Union or any nation to reflag Kuwaiti shipping in exchange for naval protection. The United States did not respond immediately to the request. Conversely, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity and promptly chartered Soviet registered vessels to Kuwait, which under these circumstances secured Soviet naval protection. This incident caused a response from the United States wherein it agreed to reflag 11 Kuwaiti ships in March 1987.¹⁵² Otherwise, as Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger stated, "should we not be responsive to Kuwait's request for help, the Soviets will be quick to supplant us," as the major protector in the Persian

War," The Economist, May 30, 1987, p. 39.

¹⁵²According to official US documents, Kuwait solicited the US, USSR, or any other nations to reflag its oil tankers. And the reason for the delay in the U.S. response to the Kuwaiti government was the length of the process of assessing the implications for U.S. national security. Some commentators suggest that the US agreed to Kuwait's reflagging requests because of the Soviet chartering of Kuwaiti ships. For a statement of policy at that time, see Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1987, "U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging," Current Policy No. 978 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 16 June 1987), p. 2. And also, "Meanwhile, in Moscow..." The Economist, August 15, 1987, p. 32; and Gamble, "Prospects for West European Security Co-operation," p. 39.

Gulf.¹⁵³ The West could not afford to allow the realization of such a risk.

The Western strategic focus seemed to shift dramatically with these developments. When the Iran-Iraq war was contained, it seemed as if the allies continued with business as usual,¹⁵⁴ but with the new United States overtures to Kuwait and with the increased Soviet naval operations in the Persian Gulf the allies started to express some concern. Events escalated further when the USS Stark was hit, perhaps inadvertently, by an Iraqi Exocet missile on May 17, 1987. This incident gave Washington further determination in expediting its plans for naval escorts for the 11 reflagged Kuwaiti vessels and for "the need to bring the Iran-Iraq war to the promptest possible end."¹⁵⁵ The Stark incident made the Congress bitter regarding the Administration's Persian Gulf policies. The Congress insisted that America should ask its allies to bear some of the burden in patrolling the

¹⁵³ Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 178.

¹⁵⁴ For an assessment of the trade and military involvement of the West European allies in the Persian Gulf region, see Paul E. Gallis, "The NATO Allies and the Persian Gulf," in The United States, Western Europe and Military Intervention Overseas, ed., by Christopher Coker, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 37-60.

¹⁵⁵ President's Statement, 18 May 1987, in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 87, No. 2124., pp. 58-59.

Persian Gulf. The Administration accordingly put off the decision to escort the ships until June 1987.¹⁵⁶

Weinberger did exactly what the Congress suggested, and on May 26, 1987, he requested alliance support during a Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels. He argued that the Persian Gulf should be a major concern for all the allies and a facet of NATO responsibility since most of Western Europe's oil comes from that region and passes through sea lanes that were then being threatened by the Iran-Iraq war. Weinberger received a rather cool response with the exception of the Netherlands which expressed some interest in having a role in the Gulf. France, on the other hand, was being approached outside the NATO framework and Britain was apparently being non-committal on any security matter because of upcoming elections. Aside from this, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher seemed wary about becoming entangled in such a venture because of the criticism she received for her support of the American bombing of Libya in 1986. The Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, was quoted as opposing any involvement with American intervention in the Gulf. Meanwhile, Lord Carrington, NATO's Secretary-General,

¹⁵⁶ Facts on File, Vol. 47. No. 2426, 22 May 1987, (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1987), pp. 362 and 377.

suggested that any effort taken by the Alliance to act in the Gulf would contravene the Treaty.¹⁵⁷

American policy makers argued that ending the Iran-Iraq war was of paramount importance. Richard Murphy said that, "[s]ince the interests of the entire Western world are involved in the [G]ulf, the United States would welcome—indeed, expects renewed expression of public support and assistance from our allies in Western Europe...."¹⁵⁸ The United States considered that the allies could meet this need in various forms, including:

- diplomatic channels to bring an end to the war;
- restricting the flow of arms to Iran;
- or, coordinating naval cooperation in the Persian Gulf.¹⁵⁹

The reality of this matter was that the United States had to pursue these arrangements outside the formal NATO consultation process and try to arrange some type of co-operation on a bilateral basis with its Western European allies. Even under these terms the United States solicitation

¹⁵⁷ Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 177. See also, "Weinberger Asks For Help in Gulf," New York Times, May 27, 1987. And, Edward Cody, "U.S. Seeks NATO Support for Bigger Role in Gulf," Washington Post, May 27, 1987. Facts on File, Vol. 47, No. 2428, 5 June 1987, p. 401.

¹⁵⁸ Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 29, 1987 by Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. "The Persian Gulf: Stakes and Risks," Department of State Bulletin, Vol 87. No. 2124, July 1987, p. 66.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

for assistance in the Persian Gulf was rejected by all of the major Western European allies.¹⁰⁰

President Ronald Reagan took the opportunity of presenting his Gulf policy during the seven-power Venice Summit in June 1987, but it was poorly received. Consequently, the United States intensified its consultations informally with Britain and France because the formal channels were unsuccessful. The Western Europeans looked upon the American policy in the Gulf with apprehension because of certain risks that were involved. For instance, the Western Europeans perceived American Gulf policy as a means to deter Soviet encroachment, rather than to end the Iran-Iraq war. This view was taken because Western and Soviet interests were convergent on the point of preventing an Iranian victory in the war. This intense debate was ongoing even though the United States had yet to start escorting the 11 reflagged Kuwaiti vessels.¹⁰¹

Despite the French and British wariness over American Gulf policy, Paris and London had already committed considerable naval assets in the region. Britain had 10 ships in the Gulf, while France augmented its forces in late July 1987 to 15

¹⁰⁰Fay Wiley, "Why Europe and Japan Won't Help," Newsweek, June 8, 1987, p. 35.

¹⁰¹Sam Younger, "Europe's Middle East Conundrum," in RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1988, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 163. See also, James M. Markham, "France and Britain Uneasy With U.S. Gulf Policy," New York Times, July 8, 1987. And, David Hoffman, "Britain Still Weighs Mine Sweeper Aid, Fitzwater Says," Washington Post, August 4, 1987.

ships by ordering the deployment of an aircraft carrier and two frigates to the region. At the time the British and French task force missions were to keep a close eye on their respective nations' commercial vessels.¹⁶²

On July 20, 1987 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 598, which called for the cease-fire in the war. Iraq complied and ceased its attacks while Iran continued its hostile actions. Two days later the first escorts by American naval forces began. Shortly after, the Bridgeton was struck by a mine and this caused the United States to start minesweeping countermeasures. Washington requested the assistance of its European allies in mine countermeasure warfare. Britain and France at first rejected the American requests. However, when more mines were found, British and French policy makers reversed their previous decision and separately ordered minesweepers into the Gulf on August 11, 1987. It is noteworthy that each country decided to emphasize that it was operating independently to protect its exclusively national interests.¹⁶³

¹⁶²"They're not all wimps," The Economist, September 26, 1987.

¹⁶³David Hoffman, "Britain Still Weighs Mine Sweeper Aid, Fitzwater Says," Washington Post, August 4, 1987. See also, "The dog that barked, but (so far) has declined to bite," The Economist, August 15, 1987, p. 31. Gambles, Prospects for West European Security Co-operation, p. 39. And, Loren Jenkins, "Europeans Send Mine Sweepers," Washington Post, August 12, 1987.

Nevertheless, Britain took the lead under the WEU forum in gathering Western European support for Gulf naval operations. Aided by the Netherlands, the leading mine countermeasure warfare nation in NATO, Britain orchestrated the idea of developing European coordination in the Gulf under WEU auspices. Consequently, on August 20, 1987, the WEU nations held a meeting to develop a plan of action for conducting joint operations in the Gulf. Immediately following the meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans Van Den Broek, reported that the Netherlands was committed to sending minesweepers to the Gulf. This sudden move put pressure on the Italian government to support the Gulf initiative, but the allies were resigned to the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) reluctance because of its constitutional constraints. Details of the plan were finally worked out by September 1987.¹⁶⁴

Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti's objections to operating in the Gulf were mainly founded in his insistence that peacekeeping efforts should be orchestrated by the United Nations. However, in early September 1987 the political agenda changed when an Iranian speed boat shot at an Italian commercial vessel in the Gulf. Within a few days, the Italian Cabinet decided on independent naval operations in the Gulf

¹⁶⁴Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 181. And also, Elizabeth Pond, "Dutch Ships to Gulf Signal Renewed Interest in Western Alliance," Christian Science Monitor, August 25, 1987.

and ordered the deployment of eight ships. Belgian officials, on the other hand, followed the Dutch lead to operate jointly when the final details of their deployment were coordinated with the British. The FRG did not send forces to the Gulf, but instead relieved other NATO naval assets that were diverted from the Mediterranean to the Gulf. Luxembourg gave financial support to the Gulf efforts, and thus the entire membership of the WEU was involved in these operations.¹⁶⁵

Interestingly, the United States-Western European Union co-ordinated naval operations were conducted on an ad hoc basis. However, as Sherwood noted, "the allied navies in the gulf inevitably worked together to maximize their effectiveness and minimize the risk to their forces."¹⁶⁶ Unquestionably, this incident was the first successful operation that effectively demonstrated the West's ability to work together in defense of common strategic interests in the Middle East. Three years later, in 1990, the allies would

¹⁶⁵Edward Cody, "Chain of Events in Persian Gulf Led Reluctant Allies to Join U.S.," Washington Post, September 20, 1987. For a noteworthy analysis on the prospects of past and future Alliance cooperation in out-of-area operations, see Joseph I. Coffey, "Security in the Middle East: can the Allies do better?" NATO Review, No. 5 (October 1989), pp. 20-25. Although not a member of the WEU, Norway assisted in the Gulf operations by deploying vessels to the Channel. See a report by NATO's Defense Planning Committee, Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance, December 1988, pp. 43-44.

¹⁶⁶Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, p. 182.

again be called upon to respond, this time with even greater force, owing to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

D. THE SECOND UNITED STATES-WEU *AD HOC* CO-ORDINATED OPERATION: RESPONDING TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT

As the Cold War ended, the possibilities of an East-West confrontation in the Middle East seemed far removed. For instance, past events such as the United States-Soviet standoff in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 or the Soviet expansion into Afghanistan in 1979, seemed to be things of the past. However, the emergence of new threats such as Islamic fundamentalism, Iran's radicalism, and intra-regional conflict contributed to instability which directly affected the West's vital interests. On August 2, 1990, the West had to deal with its first significant security threat in the post-Cold War era- Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

When Iraq's forces invaded Kuwait the United States had only eight warships in the Persian Gulf, while the aircraft carrier USS Independence was in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the USS Saratoga battle group was moving into position in the Eastern Mediterranean. This small naval force was hardly the means to displace President Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. Consequently, Washington's immediate response was to initiate non-military actions by seeking a United Nations condemnation of Iraqi aggression. However, the possibility of

military intervention was not ruled out. President George Bush gained quick support from his European allies on economic sanctions via an unprecedented action when "the European Community nations, which in previous years hesitated to support U.S. initiatives in the Middle East, made strong commitments [in response] to Washington's call for economic sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait."¹⁶⁸

Unfortunately, Saddam was determined to maintain his forces on Kuwait's soil. Therefore, on August 8, Bush made an address to the nation from Washington, and said:

In the last few days I've spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas, and I've met with British Prime Minister Thatcher, [Canadian] Prime Minister Mulroney, and NATO Secretary General Woerner. And all agree that Iraq cannot be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait.¹⁶⁹

Bush consequently committed air and ground forces to be deployed in Saudi Arabia. The President's military commitment received unanimous support two days later from a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner made a formal statement on August 10 regarding Kuwait's situation:

¹⁶⁷Geraldine Brooks, James Tanner, Gerald F. Seib, and John J. Fialka, "Persian Gulf Crisis," Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1990.

¹⁶⁸"Japan, EC support Economic Sanctions," Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1990.

¹⁶⁹See address to the nation by President Bush from the oval office in the White House, on August 8, 1990, The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 1292.

[The] Ministers supported President Bush's decision to assist Saudi Arabia and the dispatch of military forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France...They agreed that the members of this Alliance will contribute, each in its own way, to stopping further Iraqi military aggression.

Interestingly, the United States did not appeal to NATO to act in the Gulf militarily, but was seeking as much support as possible by using NATO as a forum for consultation.¹⁷⁰ Unquestionably, the positive European response was a sort of "diplomatic revolution," because it was an absolute reversal of previous attitudes regarding out-of-area co-ordination between the allies, attitudes that have been so problematic within NATO since the 1956 Suez Canal debacle. Robert K. Olson has suggested that France, Britain, and Italy (major European out-of-area powers) have grudgingly participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Middle East since the 1980's. As a result, according to Olson, the United States has become the dominant power in protecting the West's security interests in this region. In contrast, Olson contends, the Western Europeans have been relegated to the

¹⁷⁰See Secretary General Manfred Woerner's press statement on Kuwait Situation, in NATO Review, NO. 4. August 1990, p. 10.

¹⁷¹Alan Riding, "NATO, Bereft of a Military Role, Redefines Itself as the West's Political Galvanizer," New York Times, August 9, 1990. See also press Conference by Secretary of State James Baker, Brussels, August 10. 1990, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis" American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1990, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1991), pp. 477-478.

sidelines as vocal but impotent critics of United States policy in the Middle East.¹⁷²

In the Gulf crisis, however, the United States received swift and decisive diplomatic backing from its NATO allies. NATO as a political-military organization was not officially represented in the Gulf war, but its members were represented as individual nations under United Nations auspices. Many Western Europeans were criticized by the United States for their slow military response.¹⁷³ This situation changed on August 21, 1990, when the WEU forged a joint Gulf policy to dispatch a naval task force to the Persian Gulf. Hence, on August 22, 1990, the governments of Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands deployed a naval task force under WEU auspices.¹⁷⁴ NATO, on the other hand, retained its formal role during the Gulf crisis and limited operations to the "defence of NATO territory in the southern region and of

¹⁷²For an insightful historical analysis of Europe's relations with the Middle East since 1949, see Robert K. Olson, "Europe returns to the Middle East," American-Arab Affairs, Fall 1990, No. 24, pp. 46-47.

¹⁷³Alan Riding, "NATO Struggling to Redefine Itself," The New York Times, August 24, 1990.

¹⁷⁴John K. Cooley, "Pre-war Gulf Diplomacy," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 2, (March/April 1991), p. 136. See also, Howard LaFranchi, "Europeans Forge Joint Gulf Policy," Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1990.

ships and aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea...against military and terrorist threats."¹⁷⁵

As one commentator reported, the Gulf crisis would be a "[t]est [of] whether Europeans have the collective will to defend Europe's own interests or, once again, will simply 'let the Yanks do it.'"¹⁷⁶ The difference for the allies in this out-of-area problem was its global implications. Consequently, the allies responded quickly with diplomatic support for the United States and the United Nations, but were generally slower in providing military support.

Britain, however, was overwhelmingly supportive of the United States-led international coalition and the United Nations resolutions. In fact, of the European allies, only Britain expeditiously provided planes, ships, and ground forces to the Gulf. The British public supported the idea of going to war, and this facilitated Britain's participation in the international coalition. Britain's role in this conflict was outstanding compared to the level of forces furnished by other major European allies such as France, Germany, and Italy.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," Survival, Vol. 33, No. 3, (May/June 1991), p. 249.

¹⁷⁶ George Melloan, "Europe Tiptoes into the Gulf Crisis," Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1990.

¹⁷⁷ Louise Fawcett and Robert O'Neill, "Britain, The Gulf Crisis and European Security," in Western Europe and the Gulf, eds., Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), pp.

France was initially a hesitant alliance partner in providing military support because of "doubt in Paris as to what to do in the military realm in the wake of the invasion."¹⁷⁸ In spite of France's political reservations, it did commit naval forces to the multinational forces later in August, and air and ground forces followed in September. France, however, was at first determined to act independently from the de facto leadership of the United States by establishing its own command and control structure for not only France but also the WEU.¹⁷⁹ Eventually this distinct command and control structure caused operational problems for the French air and ground forces working with the coalition forces in the Gulf. These difficulties ultimately led France to review its force command structure and to choose to come under the "operational control" of the United States.¹⁸⁰

Germany interpreted its Basic Law or constitution as prohibiting German forces from participating in out-of-area

141-158.

¹⁷⁸Francois Heisbourg, "France and the Gulf Crisis," in Western Europe and the Gulf, eds., Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1992), p. 18.

¹⁷⁹Howard LaFranchi, "Europeans Forge Joint Gulf Policy," Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1990. See also Young, "Preparing the Western Alliance for the Next Out-of-Area Campaign," p. 35.

¹⁸⁰David S. Yost, France and the Gulf War: Political-Military Lessons Learned, (Monterey, CA., Naval Postgraduate School, 1992), p. 9.

campaigns. In a word, the politicians agreed that the Basic Law only allowed German armed forces to be used for self-defense. However, it would appear that Germany was also reluctant to be involved in the Gulf Crisis, because it was concentrating on finalizing its reunification arrangements.¹⁸¹

Italy was initially undecided about supporting the United Nations embargo on Iraqi oil. Fortunately, Spain, Germany, and Italy did permit the United States to use NATO bases in those countries, unlike in some past Middle East conflicts. Greece maintained that its military facilities would be used for NATO operations only, especially the bases in Crete.¹⁸²

After the United States authorized the deployment of 50,000 troops, the European allies still had reservations about military action. Ten days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, neither the British nor any other ally had sent ground troops to augment the United States forces. France's President Francois Mitterrand said: "France would like to see the problem solved within the Arab community. If that turns out to be impossible, France will assume its responsibilities." Germany's Defense Minister added that his

¹⁸¹Ronald D. Asmus, Germany After the Gulf War, N-3391-AF (Santa Monica, CA., Rand Corporation, 1992), p. 4.

¹⁸²George Melloan, "Europe Tiptoes into the Gulf Crisis," Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1990. See also, Alan Riding, "NATO, Bereft of a Military Role, Redefines itself as the West's Political Galvanizer," New York Times, August 9, 1990.

country would only replace naval vessels that were diverted to the Gulf from the Mediterranean sea. Turkey also refused to commit any of its ground forces to the Gulf. Woerner said that there would be no action under NATO's integrated command structure and that the Gulf Crisis required "[a]ction of the entire international community."¹⁸³

As the Gulf crisis progressed, the United States called for an increase in ground forces from not only the European allies but also the rest of the international community. By September 1990 the United States had committed 155,000 ground forces in the Gulf area, and (of its NATO allies) only Britain and France had committed ground forces, and those numbers were relatively small.¹⁸⁴ Germany reiterated that it could not commit military forces, but offered to increase its financial contribution for Gulf operations.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, European alliance solidarity increased to unprecedented heights for an out-of-area operation, and the WEU countries "decided to reinforce their cooperation in the Gulf by extending it to air

¹⁸³R.W. Apple Jr., "U.S. Set to Blockade Baghdad's Shipping," New York Times, August 10, 1990. Alexander MacLeod, "Thatcher's Gulf Move Wins Broad Support Among British Public," Christian Science Monitor, August 13, 1990. See also, Woerner's comments in, NATO Review, No. 4, August 1990, p. 10.

¹⁸⁴Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Members to Weigh Adding Troops to Gulf Force," New York Times, September 11, 1990.

¹⁸⁵For a concise account of Germany's foreign policy shift and its contributions to the Gulf Crisis see Asmus, Germany After the Gulf War, pp. 10-19.

and land forces."¹⁸⁶ Ironically, Washington still criticized the Western Europeans for not doing enough. Bush ordered the deployment of U.S. military forces from Europe to support the Gulf operations, but requested that the NATO allies complete the transfer because they were in a better position to do so.¹⁸⁷ NATO defense ministers did agree to assist in transporting military forces from Europe to the Gulf area.¹⁸⁸

In November 1990 the United States decided to deploy at least 400,000 troops to the Gulf. Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, indicated that he was disappointed with the European performance in support of the Gulf crisis. "Europe had not fully measured up to expectations," said Aspin. The Europeans countered that the Americans had some misperceptions of their support for the multinational force. Italy's Minister of Defence, Virginio Rognoni, said, "[w]e consider that the European response will

¹⁸⁶See, Francine S. Kiefer, "Bonn to Offer More Aid, but No Troops, for Gulf Efforts," Christian Science Monitor, September 13, 1990. For increased WEU support of air and land forces see, Howard LaFranchi, "Western Europe Bolsters its Involvement in Gulf," Christian Science Monitor, September 20, 1990.

¹⁸⁷Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Asks Allies to Help Move Troops to Gulf," New York Times, November 23, 1990.

¹⁸⁸Daniel A. Doherty, NATO "Out-of-Area": An Historical Perspective and Post-Cold War Potential, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 66.

be seen to be adequate and timely."¹⁸⁹ The Gulf crisis clearly demonstrated that NATO countries considered the Iraqi aggression a challenge for the international community as a whole and not mainly a problem for NATO to deal with.¹⁹⁰

E. PROSPECTS FOR A WEU-UNITED STATES SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

Besides the out-of-area contingencies in the Middle East discussed in this thesis NATO had difficulty in agreeing on the following issues during the 1980s:

- 1) Trying to establish a multinational naval force during the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 to enforce the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz;
- 2) Setting up a multinational force in Lebanon in 1982-83;
- 3) Coordinating mine countermeasures in the Red Sea in 1984; and
- 4) the retaliatory strikes on Libya by the United States in 1986.¹⁹¹

On the other hand, in 1987 West European foreign policies began to converge on Middle East security issues. This

¹⁸⁹For Congressman Aspin's statements see, Michael R. Gordon, "U. S. Asks Allies to Help Move Troops to Gulf," New York Times, November 24, 1990. For Minister of Defense Rognoni's response see, "Europe and the Gulf crisis," NATO Review, No. 6, December 1990, p. 1. For details about the contributions ultimately made by the Europeans, see Jacomet, "The role of WEU in the Gulf War," pp. 170-180, and the Military Balance 1991-1992, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), pp. 238-242.

¹⁹⁰Daniel A. Doherty, NATO Out-Of-Area: An Historical Perspective and Post-Cold War Potential, (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 70.

¹⁹¹Willem van Eekelen, "WEU and the Gulf Crisis," p. 523.

resulted in the WEU's success in co-ordinating security policy with the United States during the 1987-1988 "tanker war." For this reason, some European officials have suggested that the WEU could be the channel for co-operation between the European political union and NATO.¹⁹² This in essence would have a bridging effect by co-ordinating the Atlantic Alliance's European pillar and United States foreign and security policy.

Josef Joffe has suggested that the WEU has a mission but lacks the means to implement a military operation. Similarly, William H. Taft IV noted that the Gulf coalition could not have completed its mission without NATO's logistical support. This suggests that NATO has the means but no mission for out-of-area operations.¹⁹³ Thomas -Durrell Young suggests that it would be a wasted effort for the United States to push NATO to incorporate out-of-area missions. "There is too much emotional baggage, particularly in Europe, for such an eventuality and it would also most likely exclude the one European country most interested... (i.e.,

¹⁹²This idea was noted in a joint statement by Foreign Ministers Roland Dumas and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. See David S. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," Survival, Vol. 33, No.4, (July/August 1991), p. 334.

¹⁹³Josef Joffe, "Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends," Survival, (Spring 1992), p. 47. See also, William H. Taft, IV., "European Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War," NATO Review, June 1991, p. 8.

France).¹⁹⁴ It has been suggested that double-hatting could possibly solve the WEU's problem. Double-hatting, as defined by David S. Yost,

simply means forces can be earmarked for assignment to various possible authorities in terms of operational control, with national leaders deciding which line of command to activate in a crisis (NATO, WEU, national, ad hoc or even a UN mandate).¹⁹⁵

The components of the WEU's operational capability are still being debated. But what is essential for the United States and the WEU to work out is the dynamics of interaction for future contingencies beyond Europe. The very fact that ad hoc co-operation between the WEU and the United States was successful in two recent Middle East contingencies warrants the establishment of a formal systematic security arrangement for future matters.¹⁹⁶ According to William H. Taft IV, "[a]n integrated European force, interoperable with US and other NATO forces, could be a valuable element in future crises."¹⁹⁷ Robert B. Zoellick, Counselor of the United

¹⁹⁴Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing The Western Alliance for the Next Out-of-Area Campaign: Linking NATO and the WEU, (Carlisle Barracks, PA., U.S. Army War College, 1991), p. 13.

¹⁹⁵Although double-hatting was not advocated by Yost, his definition of double-hatting was used for ease of explanation. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," p. 335.

¹⁹⁶For an excellent essay on establishing institutional links between the WEU and NATO see, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, "The European Security Architecture: Translantic Links Remain Indispensable," NATO Review, No. 1, (February 1991), pp. 11-14.

¹⁹⁷Taft, "European Security: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War," p. 11.

States Department of State, has suggested that "[w]e need collective approaches to resolve or deter regional conflicts before they spark. We also need joint action to address those that nevertheless erupted."¹⁹⁸ He further substantiates this point by suggesting that there are various options open for the European pillar of NATO and NATO itself in coordinating action to address security concerns. In his view, "cooperative operations among the United States and other member states with the Western European Union (WEU) could supply a valuable mechanism for tackling regional security problems."¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Robert B. Zoellick, "The New Europe in a New Age: Insular, Itinerant, or International? Prospects for an Alliance of Values," Current Policy, No. 1300, (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State 21 September, 1990), p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

V. CONCLUSION

Examining the origins of NATO and its formative years demonstrates why the out-of-area issue was a significant problem for the member nations. This thesis concludes that the out-of-area problem has existed since Bevin's conception of a transatlantic alliance. The initial architects of this pact envisaged establishing a string of regional defensive pacts world-wide. This notion was immediately dismissed because it seemed to be impractical; and it appeared that the West was trying to encircle the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the transatlantic alliance was the solution for the defense of the West. Yet, the participating governments in the Treaty talks had differing views on membership, coupled with the problem of defining the geographic limits of the Treaty. This signaled the beginning of the out-of-area debate for the North Atlantic pact. At first the focus of the dispute was mainly a European geographic one. However, it was soon extended to include colonial possessions too. The participants were unable to establish a system to deal with these issues. Hence, in the years to come the out-of-area problem intermittently hindered the solidarity of the strongest defensive pact in the world.

Historically, NATO's out-of-area problems were implicitly complicated by the interrelated disputes over the consultation

process, American anticolonialism, and defining the threat during interventions.

After extensive evaluation of the Suez Crisis and the Yom Kippur War, one could conclude that the conflicting national security policies of the United States were a primary reason for the alliance's out-of-area problems. However, one could also suggest that European unwillingness to abandon colonial interests could be blamed as well. Arguably, allies on both sides of the Atlantic must assume some responsibility for not resolving NATO's out-of-area problem.

In view of the history behind this problem, it seems unlikely that NATO will be able to agree on conducting extra-European security operations in the future. This thesis has argued that efforts to make NATO the framework for the co-ordination of out-of-area operations seem likely to bring up past transatlantic differences. Responding to out-of-area security challenges through cooperation between the United States and the WEU seems to be a more politically practical measure than using the NATO framework. This approach to addressing Western security concerns in the Middle East was quite successful in 1987-1988 and 1990-1991.

Unquestionably, NATO's out-of-area problem has been difficult to overcome. As suggested in this thesis, the allies most capable of conducting military operations beyond Europe have sometimes had incompatible policies on this matter. In short, the United States and Britain have no

objection to using NATO for out-of-area purposes, while France does have such objections. Germany has historically had reservations about participating with military means in out-of-area operations, whatever the auspices (NATO, WEU, UN, etc.). Italy's participation in such operations has typically been within the European or United Nations dimension.

Because of the diverse policies on the use of NATO in contingencies beyond Europe, it would seem prudent to develop a vehicle that was used successfully on two separate occasions, that is, United States-WEU *ad hoc* cooperation in the Middle East. Moreover, this type of cooperation between two of the pillars of NATO is seemingly more practical politically than through NATO itself. The allies must develop institutional links between the WEU and NATO in order to respond effectively to future contingencies beyond Europe. In this way the United States and the WEU can utilize all of their capabilities and assets to defend Western security interests with maximum effectiveness.

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